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A. General discussion on the role of judicial scrutiny and discretion1 
 
Mainstream law and economics perceives judicial review as having primarily an 
error-correction function2. Judicial review may also play additional roles, such as to 
guarantee procedural fairness through the protection of the rights of the parties, to 
ensure accountability with the promotion of deliberative and administrative processes 
or to ensure consistency, from a legal perspective, in the action of the reviewed 
authority, or finally to protect substantive fundamental rights, such as private 
property or the freedom of commerce3. At the same time, judicial review may impose 
costs on the regulators, the undertakings and the wider economy and may affect the 
effectiveness of the action of competition authorities. An intensive judicial scrutiny of 
the action of the authorities may discourage competition authorities from taking 
action, when this may be judged controversial, because of the fear of being 
overturned by the courts. Hence, the effectiveness of competition law enforcement 
may be negatively affected, in particular general deterrence. Furthermore, the 
principle of the separation of powers may lead courts to impose some self-restraint 
on the intensity of their scrutiny of competition authorities’ decisions in some 
circumstances.  
 
When the implementation of competition policy is entrusted to an independent 
administrative authority (administrative enforcement system), such as an integrated 
competition law agency exercising the functions of case selection, investigation, 
examination and adoption of the final decision, the courts exercise a merely 
“supervisory” jurisdiction, as they are concerned by the legality of the authority’s 
action, rather than its opportunity and merits. Even when the implementation of 
competition policy is entrusted to competition authorities and courts exercising a trial 
jurisdiction, the authorities bringing cases at first instance in front of specialised 
tribunals (a prosecutorial system), it is possible to argue that courts holding appellate 
jurisdiction (e.g. Supreme Courts) should exercise some self-restraint, in view of the 
fact that the law has been implemented directly by a specialised court. It is expected 
that a generalist court should recognize the limits of its own expertise and defer, in 
certain matters, to the view of the specialised tribunal (in a prosecutorial system), or 
that of a competition authority (in the presence of an administrative enforcement 
system). In view of their specialised expertise, specialised tribunals and competition 
authorities may be treated alike, with regard to their relation to a generalist court 
                                                          
1
 We do not include a separate bibliography for this report. For bibliographical references, please 
consult the bibliography included in the report Lianos, I., Jenny, F., Wagner von Papp, F., 
Motchenkova E., David, E. et al (2014) An Optimal and Just Financial Penalties System for 
Infringements of Competition Law: a Comparative Analysis (CLES Research paper series 3/2014, 
UCL Faculty of Laws: London). 
2
 See Shavell, S. (1995) “The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction” Journal of Legal 
Studies 24, 379. 
3
 Andreangeli, A. (2012) “Competition law and human rights: striking a balance between business 
freedom and regulatory intervention” in Lianos, I. and Sokol, D. (eds) The Global Limits of 
Competition Law , Stanford University Press, 22-36. 
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exercising an appellate function. In addition, in the context of an administrative 
enforcement system, one may advance the argument that policymaking should not 
be delegated in the hands of politically unaccountable judges but remain in the 
hands of politically accountable agencies. The legal framework needs, therefore, to 
strike a careful balance between the need to ensure accountability and accuracy of 
the interventions of competition authorities, without inadvertently holding back their 
action and transforming the courts into competition authorities.  
 
It follows from the above that competition authorities (and by analogy specialised 
tribunals) should be given some form of discretion. Even if the reviewing court has 
superior competence on issues of law, there should still be some discretion given to 
the specialised court having trial jurisdiction and/or the competition authority with 
regard to questions of facts and policy. The term discretion defines the function of 
the agency and describes the role of the reviewing court. Charles Koch accounts for 
five different uses of the term discretion in administrative law: 
 
“The authority to make individualizing decisions in the application of general 
rules can be characterized as “individualizing discretion”. Freedom to fill in 
gaps in delegated authority in order to execute assigned administrative 
functions may be called “executing discretion”. The power to take action to 
further societal goals is “policymaking discretion”. If no review is permitted, the 
agency is exercising “unbridled discretion”. Finally, if the decision cannot by 
its very nature be reviewed, the agency is exercising “numinous discretion”4.  
These different degrees of discretion hint at different functions and forms of judicial 
review.  
The judicial scrutiny of competition law decisions may take various forms. One may 
distinguish according to the different standards of review, that is, the grounds on 
which the regulator’s decisions may be challenged before a judge.  
 
Judicial review focuses on the lawfulness of the action of the reviewed authority, 
based on specific grounds. They do not entail a rehearing of the case. There have 
traditionally been three grounds for judicial review5, which may overlap and 
eventually merge with each other6:  
 
 Illegality: when the administrative authority acted ultra vires in a manner 
which is inconsistent with the parameters imposed by a superior source of 
                                                          
4
 Koch,C.H, (1986)  “Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion” George Washington Law Review, 
54 (4), 469-511, 470. 
5
 These principles were elaborated upon by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister 
for Civil Service [1985] AC 374, 410.   
6
 See, Lord Irvine LC in Boddington v British Transport Police [1999] 2 AC 143 at 152 E-F: “the 
various grounds for judicial review run together. The exercise of a power for an improper purpose 
may involve taking irrelevant considerations into account, or ignoring relevant considerations; and 
either may lead to an irrational result”. Yet, there is no need to prove irrationality in  
7 
 
law, the decision was taken for improper purposes, when the authority 
impermissibly expands its discretion or takes into account unlawful 
considerations in its decision, 
 
 Irrationality/unreasonableness in the exercise of any discretion (a concept 
which can be interpreted in different ways)7, and  
 
 Procedural impropriety: when, for instance, the authority has not followed 
the right procedures, such as the requirement to give reasons, the right to be 
heard and the rule against biased decision-making.  
 
 
 The courts also accept that a breach of legitimate expectations constitutes 
a discrete ground for judicial review, when an individual has been given an 
expectation that the authority in charge has not fulfilled.  
 
These categories are nor exhaustive nor mutually exclusive. Although the process of 
judicial review and its emphasis on the legality of the authority’s action indicates that 
the court will not engage thoroughly with questions of fact and policy but will instead 
focus on issues of law, the boundaries between these three categories are often 
difficult to establish, with the result that their relation can be better explained as 
forming a continuum. This is the reason why a manifest error in the assessment of 
facts may constitute a ground for review, without the court being expected to conduct 
a full factual assessment.  
 
In contrast, a review on the merits (or often referred to as an appeal process) will 
examine all possible grounds of review, including a full factual assessment of the 
rationality and opportunity of the authority’s action. It involves a consideration of 
whether the decision of the authority was right. The court will attempt to go beyond 
the usual grounds of review in order to determine what the decision of the authority 
should have been, in view of its statutory duties. A decision may thus be found legal, 
                                                          
7
 English courts tend to consider that an irrational or unreasonable decision must be "so outrageous in 
its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his 
mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it": Council of Civil Service Unions -v- 
Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374. The CAT elaborated on the concept of irrationality in 
BAA v Competition Commission (No. 2) [2012] CAT 3 20(3) - 20(4), 20(08) (asking the 
Competition Authority to take reasonable steps to acquaint itself with the relevant information to 
enable it to answer each statutory question posed for it as well as to have a sufficient basis in light 
of the totality of the evidence available to it for making the assessments and in reaching the 
decisions it did. To the extent to which it is necessary to carry out investigations to achieve this 
objective, the CAT requires evaluative assessments to be made by the OFT, as to which it has a 
wide margin of appreciation as it does in relation to other assessments to be made by it. Finally, 
the CAT intervenes only if no reasonable competition authority could have been satisfied on the 
basis of the inquiries made. The CAT should examine the “whole” context of the decision and 
should not aim to “trawl through the long and detailed reports of the [Competition Authority] with a 
fine-tooth comb to identify arguable errors“). 
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following judicial review, if it was made according to the law, and it is not 
unreasonable or made with procedural impropriety, but nonetheless may be found 
wrong, after the careful examination of facts in the process of a review on the merits. 
However, courts will not engage with questions of policy, in view of the “executing” 
and “policymaking” discretion from which benefit competition authorities and the 
principle of separation of powers.  Executing discretion refers to the “freedom to fill in 
gaps in delegated authority in order to execute assigned administrative functions”, 
while “policy making discretion consists in “the power to take action to further 
societal goals”8. 
 
The intensity of review into the rationality of the authority’s action may also be 
variable. In the context of judicial review courts may engage in a limited intensity 
review by exploring if the authorities have gravely disregarded the limits of their 
discretion, also paying attention not to substitute their decision for that of the 
authorities (low intensity). Courts may also exercise a more intensive level of 
scrutiny of the rationality of the decision of the authority, again without substituting 
their decision for that of the authority. Yet, they may show particular self-restraint to 
engage with some of the most complex and expertise-demanding factual 
assessments of the authority, providing authorities some margin of appraisal in 
complex economic and technical issues (intermediary intensity). In such cases the 
competence to set the fine is not transferred from the authority to the court but 
remains with the authority, which is limited however in the options available to it, as it 
is not possible to choose the option declared illegal by the court. Courts may finally 
exercise a comprehensive review of the facts, which may lead them to substitute 
their own judgment for that of the authority (in the context of a review on the merits 
or “unlimited judicial review”), and/or provide to the authority a very limited margin 
of discretion with regard to the options available to it (high intensity judicial 
review). The differences between a “review on the merits” and “unlimited judicial 
review” are subtle but relate mostly to the allocation of the residual competence 
recognized in the area under examination. In the context of a review on the merits, 
the residual competence is transferred from the authority to the court, which may 
choose to reconsider the question de novo and substitute its judgment and discretion 
for that of the authority. In the context of an “unlimited judicial review”, there is no 
transfer of competence from the authority to the court. The authority keeps residual 
competence in the matter, even if the court may choose to substitute its judgment for 
that of the authority. The Court can only substitute its judgment to that of the 
authority only for the issues covered by the specific ground of review that has been 
found successful. 
 
                                                          
8
 Koch,C.H, (1986)  “Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion” George Washington Law Review, 
54 (4), 469-511, 470. 
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One may also refer to the possibility of further appeals from the courts exercising a 
limited or unlimited judicial review function to a superior court (e.g. Supreme Court). 
Two options are generally open. Either the appeal (or “pourvoi en cassation”) will be 
on points of law only (for instance on grounds of lack of competence of the appellate 
court, a breach of procedure before it avertedly affecting the interests of the 
applicant, or the infringement of law), the superior court not being able to substitute 
its own assessment for that of the inferior reviewing or appellate court, or it will 
exceptionally cover errors of fact as well (appeal in revision or “pourvoi en revision”). 
Superior courts nevertheless traditionally have taken a limited view on their role in 
such “appeals”, and it is rare that judgments of inferior courts are overturned for 
errors of fact in the very exceptional circumstances an appeal in revision has been 
granted. 
 
Consequently, in all circumstances, courts may exercise some self-restraint in order 
to provide the authority and the trial courts with the necessary degree of “executing” 
and “policymaking discretion”, in accordance with the principle of the separation of 
powers. Courts are not expected to become competition authorities. One may also 
advance a similar argument for self-restraint with regard to the relation between 
specialised tribunals exercising a trial jurisdiction and courts exercising some form of 
appellate jurisdiction, this time on the basis of the superior expertise of the 
specialised tribunal and the often limited role of the superior courts in reviewing the 
judgments of inferior courts (on points of law only and exceptionally for errors of 
fact).   
 
There are various standards of review on which the regulator’s decisions may be 
challenged before a judge, depending on the intensity of the judicial review and the 
object of judicial scrutiny (control of legality or review on the merits). Judicial scrutiny 
is often exercised on material error. Not all errors committed will result in overturning 
the decision. These may be of different sorts9: 
 
 Material error of law: the decision-maker proceeded to a wrong interpretation 
of the law or ignored a legal principle, or misapplied the legal framework to the 
facts in question (a wrong characterization of facts coming from a 
misinterpretation of existing legal categories). 
 
 Material error of fact: the decision-maker misinterpreted the facts in reaching 
a decision, that error being significant enough to have an impact on the 
ultimate decision so that it might have been different, if such error has not 
been committed. 
 
                                                          
9
 The following presentation draws on HM Government (2013) “Streamlining Regulatory and 
Competition Appeals. Consultation on Options for Reform” (June 19, 2013), 29-30. 
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 Material procedural irregularity: the procedure by which the decision was 
reached was biased, or the process was unfair to the level that the decision-
maker was not equipped with the material it would reasonably have obtained, 
had the proper procedures being followed. The procedural irregularity should 
be significant enough to have an impact on the ultimate decision so that it 
might have been different, if such error has not been committed. 
 
 Unreasonable exercise of discretion: the authority (or the trial court) has 
exercised its discretion in a way falling outside the band in which a reasonable 
decision-maker would act. This may relate to the assessment and weighing of 
evidence, performed contrary to common sense or established principles of 
logic. 
 
 Unreasonable evaluative judgments or predictions: “ ‘Judgment’ refers to 
circumstances where the regulator is engaged in an evaluative function, 
considering various factors, assessing the balance of advantages and 
disadvantages and then deciding what outcome would most appropriately 
meet the regulatory objectives”, for instance, including “a situation where a 
regulator is balancing their objectives or duties”10. “‘Prediction’ concerns 
circumstances where a regulator applies economic or other expert analysis to 
form a view on what will happen in the future, for example the effects of a 
particular price control on the market”11. It is generally accepted that “where a 
[decision-maker] has made a judgement or prediction, the appeal body should 
defer to the regulator’s expertise”. Hence, if the decision-maker focused on 
the relevant factors and followed the right logical procedures, having 
exercised its judgment in a proper manner, the court exercising an appellate 
jurisdiction should not overturn its decision. Predictions should be assessed 
as being reasonable at the time of the decision, and not at the time of the 
appeal, even if it appears that they were wrong, because of a significant lapse 
of time between the trial court’s or authority’s decision and the appeal. 
 
In the exercise of their discretion, authorities may dispose of various trade-off 
devices in setting the appropriate, to the specific circumstances, remedial action or 
sanctions. The judicial scrutiny exercised by the appellate court will vary, depending 
on the discretionary space (discretion and/or margin of appreciation) the courts give 
to the authority (or specialised tribunal). We can systematize the different options in 
the form of a continuum with three broad types of scrutiny, going from a wide 
discretionary space given to the authority to a narrower one. 
                                                          
10
 HM Government (2013) “Streamlining Regulatory and Competition Appeals. Consultation on 
Options for Reform” (June 19, 2013) 30. 
11
 HM Government (2013) “Streamlining Regulatory and Competition Appeals. Consultation on 
Options for Reform” (June 19, 2013) 30. 
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One may adopt a simple means-end rationality test, which will consider if the 
amount of penalties imposed would indeed be a rational means to a purported end 
(effective enforcement of competition law, including deterrence). This may amount to 
a simple suitability test, which would provide the decision-maker with a lot of 
discretion in adopting the requisite amount of penalty, but with the limitation that the 
amount of the penalty should be linked rationally with some limited ends (effective 
enforcement of competition law, including deterrence). Hence, the test involves a list 
of limited ends, defined according to the aims pursued by the legal framework in 
question, as it would make no sense to proceed to an analysis of means without 
having in mind the ends to which these means aim. 
Another possibility would be to assess the proportionality of the sanctions. This 
trade-off device would inquire whether the means (the level of penalty) are 
proportionate to the ends (effective enforcement of competition law, including 
deterrence). This exercise will involve in addition to considering if the means chosen 
are indeed a rational means to a purported end (step 1 of the test), some 
assessment of the possible excessive costs of the specific penalty in relation to its 
benefits (step 2), and whether the amount of penalty chosen is the least restrictive to 
the affected interests’ alternative available in order to achieve the purported 
regulatory ends (step 3). The last operation inquires whether there is a less 
restrictive (to the affected interests), reasonably available alternative to accomplish 
the same remedial end (effective enforcement and deterrence). This test will not 
amount to a cost benefit analysis, as the test does not necessarily require that the 
benefits be more important than the costs; the costs may be more than the benefits 
but the decision-maker maintains some margin of appreciation to accept non 
disproportional differences between costs and benefits in the case. 
Finally, we can categorise under the broad category of cost benefit analysis, which 
is a balancing test that attempts to measure the costs and benefits of a remedial 
option or of alternative remedial options, before choosing the most appropriate test. 
This trade-off device requires of course a more intensive fact and evidence-gathering 
exercise by the decision-maker (at first instance or when exercising an appellate 
jurisdiction), and the consideration of the values of the costs and benefits examined. 
The type of the trade-off device required depends on the capacity of the institutions 
in each jurisdiction to carry the necessary assessment. One would expect a different 
capacity in a competition authority or a specialised expert tribunal than in a 
generalist court. The control exercised by the appellate jurisdiction may thus be 
either a rationality test, or a proportionality test, or finally a cost benefit analysis test, 
the latter test restricting significantly the discretion of the competition authority and 
raising important issues of comparative institutional analysis with regard to the 
available expertise in each institution. 
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Having in mind these principles, we will examine the practice of judicial scrutiny of 
fines in Chile, before exploring the balance between effectiveness of competition 
policy and the protection of rights reached by other key jurisdictions. 
 
B. Judicial scrutiny of fines in Chile 
 
1. General data 
 
The final judgments of the specialised Competition Tribunal (TDLC) can be 
challenged before the Supreme Court. The remedy is called “recurso de 
reclamación”, which constitutes a sui generis procedure introduced for the 
implementation of Chilean Competition Law. This procedure allows the Supreme 
Court to review all legal and factual issues involved and may be compared to an 
appeal in revision. In some instances, the Supreme Court has proceeded to a full 
review of the TDLC’s determinations. 
Since the establishment of the Competition Tribunal (in 2004), the Supreme Court 
has ruled 32 times on TDLC’s judgments, on the basis of which fines were 
imposed12. In 16 cases the Supreme Court upheld the TDLC´s decision (fines 
remained unchanged). In 5 cases the Supreme Court eliminated the fine (primarily in 
the cases where the anticompetitive conduct was not properly accredited). In 3 
cases the Supreme Court has increased the fines imposed by the TDLC (considering 
the total amount). Finally, the following analysis focuses on the remaining 7 cases, 
where the Supreme Court reduced the fines imposed by the TDLC. 
 
 
                                                          
12
 It is important to emphasise that this does not reflect the total number of cases in which the TDLC 
has imposed fines.  
17, 53% 
3, 9% 
7, 22% 
5, 16% 12, 38% 
Figure 1 : Change of fines imposed by the TDLC considering Supreme Court reviews: No 
changes (remains equal), decrease, increase                                                                                                              
(N° cases; %)  
Fines remains equal
Fines (total amount) increase
Fines (total amount) decrease
Fines (total amount) reduced
to 0 (judgement reversed)
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It is noteworthy that the analysis undertaken by the Supreme Court when reviewing 
other administrative fines is different than the one undertaken when examining fines 
imposed in the enforcement of competition law.  
For instance, fines imposed by the Electricity and Fuels Commission may be 
challenged before the generalist Appeal Court of the concerned jurisdiction on issues 
of law and fact. The judgment may be challenged before the Supreme Court but only 
regarding some limited issues (“recurso de casación en la forma y recurso de 
casación en el fondo”). The role of the Supreme Court in these cases is limited to the 
review of material procedural errors or material errors of law. The Supreme Court will 
approve or disapprove the imposed fine but will not be able to reduce it or increase it 
(thus substituting its judgment to that of the appellate court).  
Similarly, fines imposed by the Securities and Insurance Commission may be 
challenged before ordinary generalist civil courts and later appealed before the 
relevant Appeals Courts. They may finally be challenged in front of the Supreme 
Court, which is limited to the review of material procedural errors or material errors of 
law (“recurso de casación en la forma y recurso de casación en el fondo”). Again, 
the Supreme Court will proceed to a limited review of these fines.  
There are different factors explaining this difference of approach. First, different 
types of judicial scrutiny apply in each case. In the context of competition law, the 
Supreme Court exercises an appellate jurisdiction in revision, examining points of 
law and fact, while in the context of utilities (energy) and securities’ regulation the 
Supreme Court exercises a limited jurisdiction on points of law only ( “pourvoi en 
cassation”). Second, in the context of competition law the Supreme Court reviews 
the judgment of a specialised tribunal exercising a trial jurisdiction and benefiting 
from an extensive expertise on matters of law and economics (and the underlying 
policy choices), while in the context of utilities (energy) and securities regulation, the 
Supreme Court reviews the judgments of ordinary generalist appellate courts. 
Hence, one may argue that the Supreme Court should proceed equally carefully in 
all these instances and recognize the limits of its own expertise on policy, when 
reviewing. 
It is true that fines imposed in the context of competition law infringements are 
generally of a higher level than that imposed in the context of utilities (energy) and 
securities regulation, as this is often the case in other jurisdictions. Although it has 
been impossible to locate a database with the imposed fines in the context of utilities 
(energy) and securities regulation, or information about the filed remedies in front of 
the Civil Courts and the Appeals Courts or the Supreme Court’s judgments, for 
comparison purposes, we have included some recent cases regarding fines imposed 
by the Electricity and Fuels Commission and the Securities and Insurance 
Commission. These fines have generally been confirmed by the Supreme Court. 
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Table 11: Judicial Scrutiny of Regulatory Fines in Chile 
Electricity and Fuels Commission (SEC) 
Case/company Fine imposed by 
SEC 
Appeal Court Supreme Court 
OSRAM. Fine 
imposed for not 
providing required 
information. 
 
UTA 200 Confirmed Confirmed 
January 2014 
OSRAM. Fine 
imposed for not 
certifying electric 
products.  
 
UTA 140 plus 
trial expenses 
Confirmed Confirmed 
January 2014 
Many electric 
companies 
responsible for a 
2010  blackout. 
 
UTA 6,300 in 
total plus 
compensation for 
consumers. 
Different companies 
appealed 
separately. Some 
succeeded, others 
not.  
Confirmed all 
fines originally 
imposed by the 
SEC. 
November 2013 
Transelec. Fine 
imposed for 
infringing the supply 
contract 
UTA 2,000 Confirmed Confirmed 
March 2013 
Gas company 
Lipigas for not 
certifying a gas 
installation of a 
building that caused 
an accident. 
UTA 200 Overturned 
(annulled fine) 
Confirmed fine 
May 2012 
Many electric 
companies involved 
in blackout 
considered 
responsible for a 
2004 blackout 
UTA 6,460 Confirmed Confirmed 
August 2011 
Many electric 
companies 
considered 
responsible for a 
2002 blackout 
UTA 13,750 in 
total 
Confirmed Confirmed 
March 2011 
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Securities and Insurance Commission  (SVS) 
Case/company Fine imposed 
by SEC 
Appeal Court Supreme Court 
María Luisa Solari and 
Marcel Zarour. Fine 
imposed for the use of 
privileged information 
UF 1,000 and 
UF 2,725 
Confirmed Confirmed 
December 2013 
CEO’s of pension funds 
administrator for the use 
of privileged information. 
UF 350 Confirmed Overturned 
(annulled fine) 
November 2013 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers. 
For breaching duties of 
care of an external audit 
firm. 
UF 8,000 Confirmed Confirmed 
November 2013 
Pablo Alcalde. Fine for 
modifying the financial 
statements of a company.  
UF 25,000 Confirmed Confirmed 
October 2013 
Juan Cueto. For use of 
privileged information. 
UF 1,620 Confirmed Confirmed 
November 2012 
Banchile stockbrokers. 
For use of “forward 
contracts”.  
UF 300 Overturned 
(annulled fine) 
Confirmed fine 
October 2011 
[Information obtained from the press] 
Yet the relative low amount of these fines may be explained from the availability of 
other types of sanctions (criminal) and the deterrent effect of private litigation for 
damages, which are not available to the same extent in the context of competition 
law enforcement. Similarly, competition law litigation always produces polycentric 
effects, in the sense that large categories of consumers or market actors (at the 
national level) are affected by competition law infringements and the impact on the 
overall economy may be particularly high. This is rarely the case for the type of 
infringements found in energy and securities regulation, which explains the need to 
factor into the setting of fines in the area of competition law considerations of specific 
and general deterrence. General deterrence may be affected by the existence of a 
legal maximum threshold for fines in the context of competition law, as it is possible 
for undertakings to adopt strategies maximizing the benefits of competition law 
infringements, in view of the limited fines they pay for it as a result of the maximum 
fines threshold. Last but not least, competition law infringements are not easily 
observable, in particular if these take the form of secret cartels, with the result that 
the probability of detection of competition law infringements is on average much 
lower than that of other types of infringement, for instance in utilities or securities 
regulation, where firms are subject to intensive regulatory scrutiny and frequent 
monitoring of their activity and accounts by regulators. Hence, if according to the 
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formula for optimal enforcement we introduced in the first part of this report, an 
optimal sanction should depend on the harm inflicted by the infringement and its 
probability of detection, the low probability of detection of competition law 
infringements and the significant harm that they inflict on consumers and the 
economy overall should justify a much higher level of penalties. 
 
2. Case Studies 
 
We proceed to the analysis of the most important cases of the Supreme Court 
examining the fines imposed by the Competition Tribunal. Cases in which Supreme 
Court has reduced the fines imposed by the TDLC are the following:  
 
1. 
CONSTRUCTORA E 
INMOBILIARIA 
INDEPENDENCIA 
LTDA. (COMPLAINT) 
vs.  AGUAS NUEVO 
SUR MAULE S.A. et al. 
DECISION 85 
Abus
e of              
domin
ance 
Construc
tion 
  
Reduced  
(-47%) 
 
In 2005, a private construction company and the FNE filed complaints against a 
sanitary services provider (Aguas Nuevo Sur). It was argued by the construction 
company that the defendant charged arbitrary and discriminatory prices for its 
services for real estate projects in the rural areas of certain regions of Chile.  
The FNE extended the complaint to other three sanitary services providers (ESSAL, 
ESSBIO and Aguas Andinas). The FNE argued that between 2003 and 2005 the 
companies made abusive requirements and charges for their sanitary services 
(clean water and sewer system) for users in urban and rural areas near to the their 
respective concession areas and that they had misused a reimbursable financing 
contribution system that was established in order to finance the expansion of the 
provision of sanitary services, to new real estate projects and developments, in their 
concession areas.  
 
The FNE13 required a fine of 65.000 UTM (5,400 UTA) for ESSBIO, 44.000 UTM 
(3,600 UTA) for Aguas Nuevo Sur, 48.000 UTM (4,000 UTA) for ESSAL and 50.000 
UTM (4,100 UTA) for Aguas Andinas. The amounts were established “mainly due to 
                                                          
13
 http://www.tdlc.cl/DocumentosMultiples/Requerimiento%20FNE.pdf 
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the economic profits obtained” by the companies. The FNE made some general 
calculations regarding how much additional charges they made to some construction 
companies, but does not explain how it got to the established number in detail.   
In July 2009 the TDLC issued a sentence14. For the purposes of determining the 
amount of the fine, the TDLC considered article 26.c DL No. 211 which states that 
the seriousness of the conduct, the economic benefit and previous offenses, must be 
taken into account.  
The TDLC found regarding the claim presented by the construction company, that 
Aguas Nuevo Sur had indeed charged abusive prices in some cases and imposed a 
fine of 1,338 UTA based on the additional amounts charged.  
Regarding the claim presented by the FNE, the TDLC found that Aguas Nuevo Sur 
and ESSBIO had misused the existing state reimbursable financing contribution 
system. The TDLC determined that Aguas Nuevo Sur had perceived benefits of at 
least 44,000 UF (2,130 UTA) and ESSBIO at least 41,000 UF (2,000 UTA). These 
results were obtained after a detailed review of information provided by Sanitary 
Services Supervisor Authority.  
In addition, the TDLC found that the abusive behaviour was important.   
Therefore the TDLC imposed a fine for Aguas Nuevo Sur Maule of 1,254 UTA (in 
addition to the previous fine) and for ESSBIO SA fine of 2,341 UTA.  
The other undertakings were not sanctioned. Nevertheless, for all of them, the TDLC 
required some changes in the pricing politics and recommended changes in the 
regulation to the authorities.  
The fine was reduced by the Supreme Court among other reasons because the 
defendants have not been previously convicted for breaches of competition law. 
Those reasons made the Supreme Court conclude that the fines imposed by the 
TDLC were disproportionate.  
Paragraph 18: “[…] This Court agrees with the conclusions of the 
judgment under appeal and, accordingly, will reject the claim of 
Aguas Nuevo Sur Maule S.A. and ESSBIO S.A. and will confirm the 
judgment that considers unwarranted the charging of the item “new 
consumption” [by the defendants]; however the Court considers that 
the amount of the fine set forth in the judgment are disproportionate 
to the conduct which is attributed to the two companies. In particular, 
the realization of type of letter c ) of Article 3 of Decree 211 
[Competition Act] are based on a series of observations about the 
new consumption factor, that even when founded, do not 
demonstrate exactly the amounts that would benefit the water 
companies to the expense of construction. Moreover, as recognized 
                                                          
14
 http://www.tdlc.cl/DocumentosMultiples/Sentencia_85_2009.pdf  
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by the ruling, Aguas Nuevo Sur Maule S.A. and ESSBIO S.A. have 
not been previously convicted for breaches of competition law and 
taking into account the request of both subsidiary undertakings for the 
purposes of requesting a reduction of fines, this Court will grant the 
request to the manner determined in the operative part of Decision”. 
 
2. 
FNE (COMPLAINT) and 
BANCO DE CHILE  vs.  
FALABELLA Y PARIS 
S.A. 
DECISION 63 
Collusio
n 
Retail      Reduced (-25%) 
 
In this case the fine is reduced by 25%, considering (i) the duration of the harmful 
event (duration of the anticompetitive behaviour); (ii) the economic benefit reported 
by the acts committed in that period (the context of the anticompetitive conduct was 
a technology trade fair, which lasted four days, in which LCD TV sets would be 
offered at special prices).  
Indirectly, the Court also considered that the fine requested by the FNE was lower 
than the fine imposed by the TDLC.  
Paragraph 34: “[...] Comparative review of the arguments contained 
in the complaint initiated by the National Economic Prosecutor's 
Office and the TDLC’s judgment evidence a similar analysis on the 
behaviour of the defendants. However, after weighing in the facts, 
they differ in the amount of the fines imposed: the amount 
recommended by the National Economic Prosecutor's Office is 
evidently lower than the fine imposed on TDLC’s judgment”. 
Paragraph 35: “Moreover, the limited duration of the punishable 
behaviour[] needs to be taken into consideration. Therefore, one of 
the factors that need to be borne in mind in determining the amount of 
the fine to be applied is the duration of the harmful event and its 
consequences over time. Indeed, the realization of the so-called 
"Technology IN Trade show of Banco de Chile" took place over four 
days (6 , 7, 8 and 9 April 2006), a situation which rules out a 
persistent or continuous violation of competition [law].  
Also, the amount of the fine should consider, among other things, the 
economic benefit accountable to the acts committed in that period. 
Therefore, it would be logical to consider a reasonable percentage 
that corresponds to the duration of the facts, unlike the TDLC’s 
judgment that in the final part of its reasoning [paragraph] 163°, 
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argues that "the amount of the fine for each participant to the 
agreement, will be approximately 2% of the 2005 sales of home 
appliances, in which customers make use of the department stores’ 
own credit card as payment method”, reasoning that extends the 
profit reported during those four days to the annual income.  
Paragraph 36: “For those reasons, this Court accepts the alternative 
claim -that both defendants have made- and will determine the 
amount of the fine in the operative part of this sentence”. 
 
3. 
FNE (COMPLAINT)  vs.  
AM PATAGONIA S.A et 
al.  
DECISION 74. 
Collusio
n 
Heatlh     Reduced (-90%) 
 
On 2006, the FNE presented a claim alleging collusion of 74 of the 84 physicians 
that worked in Punta Arenas (southern and isolated city of Chile). They had 
subscribed an agreement regarding the prices to be charged for services given by 
the different physicians and formed an association. The agreement had the effect of 
increasing the prices of the health services in Punta Arenas. The claim was 
presented on December 200615, and the FNE requested a fine of 100 UTA to the 
three physicians that were the instigators and 50 UTA for the rest of them. On 
September 200816 the TDLC issued a sentence absolving 10 physicians that did not 
(or could not due to the market conditions) raise the services prices; condemning the 
rest of them to a fine of 15 UTM (which is only 1,25 UTA) and the instigator, to 30 
UTM (2,5 UTA). The fines were considerably lower than the ones required by the 
FNE. The TDLC reduced the fine because the undertakings took actions to reduce 
the effect of the illegal conduct once aware of it and the formed association had also 
many licit purposes. In a judgment, issued in December 200817, the Supreme Court 
reduced the fine by 90%, considering (i) the duration of the anticompetitive behaviour 
(May 2005 to May 2006) and (ii) the acts followed by the defendants in order to 
mitigate the anticompetitive effects of their agreement.   
The Supreme Court considered that the TDLC’s sentence did not contained 
sufficient reasoning to support their fining decision and that the fines had been 
applied without mentioning adequate motives, grounds and circumstances. 
Therefore, the TDLC would have failed to comply with the final paragraph of Article 
26 Competition Act. The Court insisted that the development of such reasoning was 
necessary to achieve a fair trial.  
                                                          
15
 http://www.tdlc.cl/DocumentosMultiples/Requerimiento_C_121_06.pdf 
16
 http://www.tdlc.cl/DocumentosMultiples/Sentencia_74_2008.pdf 
17
 http://www.tdlc.cl/DocumentosMultiples/Sentencia_74_Corte_Suprema.pdf 
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For these reasons the Supreme Court condemned each undertaking to the fine of 
1,5 UTM (something like US 1,200). 
 
Paragraph 12: “[…] Finally, this Court will grant the defendants’ 
request, to substantially reduce the fine. To do this, this Court 
considers that first, the TDLC’s judgment does not contain sufficient 
reasoning to support their decision; so the application of fines has 
been built almost as a matter of discretion, without adequate motifs, 
grounds and circumstances for the parameters used for setting the 
amount of the fine, all of which impose a failure to comply with the 
final paragraph of Article 26 Competition Act. 
As this Court has held in previous decisions (Decision Rol No. 2339-
08), the development of such reasoning is necessary to achieve a fair 
trial, understood both on its formal or adjective dimension as well as 
on its substantive or substantial extension, especially considering this 
is directly linked to the principle of reason and proportionality, to allow 
the parties to seek a proper and clear defense and offer adequate 
judicial remedies.  
Paragraph 13: “Also in this case the restricted temporal scope of the 
acts must be considered. Therefore, one of the factors that have to be 
borne in mind in determining the amount of the fine to be applied is 
the duration of the harmful event and its consequences over time, as 
held by this Court in judgment No. 2339-08. Indeed, the TDLC itself 
established the period of the infringement from May 2005 to May 
2006 […], a situation that ruled out a persistent or continuous process 
in violation of free competition. Moreover, the decision highlights that, 
once appropriate measures are adopted by the defendants, 
Ampatagonia and the ways they operate does not pose a risk to free 
competition”.  
Paragraph 14: “[…], finally, special consideration must be given to 
the acts displayed by the defendants in order to mitigate the 
anticompetitive effects of the agreements, which also has been 
expressly recognized in the sentence by the Competition Tribunal in 
paragraph thirty-sixth”.  
Paragraph 15: “[…], for the reasons given, the Court, accepting the 
request of the defendant, will determine the fine in the amount that 
will be established in the operative part of the Decision”. 
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4. 
FNE'S COMPLAINT  
vs.  LA ASOCIACION 
GREMIAL DE BUSES 
INTERBUS et al. 
DECISION 82 
Collusio
n 
Transp
ort 
    Reduced (-50%) 
 
In this case the fine was reduced by 50%, considering (i) the number of parties sued, 
(ii) the size of the market in which they operate, and (iii) the section of the bus routes 
involved in the collusion agreement.   
 
Paragraph 11: “[…] On the aggravating circumstances considered for 
the calculation of the fine, according to the forty-second paragraph of 
the TDLC’s judgment, we conclude that to date, Article 26 of the 
Competition Act does not apply, because as is asserted in the sixth 
paragraph of the same judgment, that provision defined as 
aggravating circumstances for the former criminal responsibility on 
violations of competition law, the fact that it was a trade association 
who breached the law. On this basis, as well as considering the 
number of member of the trade association, the size of the market in 
which they operate, the section of the route which ultimately 
generated the illicit agreement, allows the Court to reduce the amount 
of the fine imposed on the defendant. This does not [] in any way 
diminish the reproach against the conduct [] which justifies its 
sanction. 
For these reasons and for the provisions of Article 27 of the 
Competition Act, the Claim raised in the main of pages 492 against 
the judgment N ° 82/2009 […] is welcomed only in what considers the 
decrease of the amount of the fine imposed on “Interbus Trade 
Association” to thirty (30) UTA18 […]”. 
 
5. 
FNE'S COMPLAINT vs.  
EMPRESA 
ELECTRICA DE 
Abuse 
of 
domina
Electri
city 
    Reduced (-25%) 
                                                          
18
 Unidad Tributaria Mensual (UTM) (literally: monthly tax unit) is a unit of account used in Chile to 
measure taxes, fines, etc. which is adjusted to inflation on a monthly basis. Unidad Tributaria 
Anual (UTA) (literally: annual tax unit) is the unit of account used in the Competition Act to 
regulate limits on fines, and is equal to 12 UTM (1 UTA = 12 UTM). On March 2014, 1 UTM = 
CLP $41.263 = USD $72,13 ($1 USD = $572 CLP on 03/17/2014), and  1 UTA = CLP $495.156 = 
USD $565,65. 
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MAGALLANES S.A. 
DECISION 73. 
nce 
 
In this case the fine is reduced by 25%, considering (i) the duration of the harmful 
event and its consequences, and (ii) the scope of the agreement (the segment of 
customers affected).  The Supreme Court also considered the fact that the defendant 
had no prior convictions for breaching competition law.  
Paragraph 18: “[…], to determine the fine, it is necessary to consider 
objective and subjective circumstances that constitute a punishable 
fact and its consequences. Therefore, one of several factors that will 
be taken into consideration in determining the amount of the fine to 
be applied is the duration of the harmful event and its consequences 
over time. Indeed, it is undisputed that the rise in rates occurred from 
January 2005; however, since January 2003 the defendant has failed 
to recover the special petroleum tax. In addition, the rise was 
maintained from January 2005 to November 2007 –the date of the 
Complaint– which led Edelmag to obtain higher profits than normal, 
only in what concerns retail customers, without affecting 
commercial/industrial customers or the Navy (high voltage customers, 
subject to AT2 rates) or street lighting, commercial clients and public 
institutions (low voltage customers, subject to BT2 rate). 
Paragraph 19: “[…] Considering what is stated in the previous 
paragraph, and also considering that Edelmag has not been the 
subject of no prior Complaints, this Court                              –
accepting the alternative claim that the defendant has made– 
determines the fine in the amount that will be established in the 
operative part of this Decision”. 
 
 
6. 
FNE'S COMPLAINT vs. 
EL SR. JOHN C. 
MALONE. DECISION 
117. 
Failure 
to 
comply 
a 
judgme
nt 
Teleco
mmuni
cation
s 
    
Reduced (-
100%) 
 
In this case the fine is eliminated, although the Supreme Court did not reversed the 
TDLC’s decision but for the establishment of a fine.  The main (and only reason) 
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exposed by the Supreme Court to waive payment of the fine is the collaborative 
attitude of the defendant, which would indicate that his intention was not to infringe 
competition rules. 
 
Summary of the case 
In March 2008 the FNE filed a complaint against John Malone, controller of VTR, 
one of Chile’s telecommunication companies. VTR had merged with another 
telecommunications company in 2004. One of the conditions for allowing the merger 
was that VTR had to abstain itself from participating in the satellite TV market. 
Nevertheless, John Malone acquired indirectly part of DirecTV Chile, a satellite TV 
operator, infringing the condition imposed by the TDLC when approving the 2004 
merger. The FNE was able to prove the infringement of the conditions, and in 
December 2011, the TDLC issued a unanimous condemnatory sentence against 
John Malone.  
 
Fine requested by the FNE 
The FNE requested a fine of UTA 2.00019. The considerations that led the FNE to 
request this fine were as following:  
(i) The seriousness of the offence. In 2004 the TDLC authorized a merger 
that strongly increased the concentration in the relevant market. This fact 
imposed a special duty to VTR as the dominant firm in the cable television 
market.  
 
(ii) The 2004 conditions prohibited any kind of acquisitions in the satellite TV 
market, even small shares acquired indirectly. Nevertheless, John Malone 
acquired the control of DirecTV.  
 
(iii) The acquisition impedes the development of paid TV in Chile since VTR is 
the dominant company in the cable TV market and DirecTV was one of its 
competitors. 
  
(iv) The FNE warned John Malone of this infringement before the acquisition 
of DirecTV’s control was made. But the warning was ignored.  
 
Fine imposed by the TDLC 
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 http://www.tdlc.cl/DocumentosMultiples/Requerimiento_FNE_C_156_08.pdf, 13. 
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The TDLC found that John Malone had breached the conditions established for the 
2004 merger. This justified imposing a measure and a penalty, both provided for in 
Article 26 of DL No.211. The first measure had the aim of obliging John Malone to 
sell its ownership in DirecTV Chile, within a short but reasonable time. For the 
purposes of determining the amount of the fine, the TDLC considered that the 
seriousness of the conduct, the economic benefit and previous offenses, must be 
taken into account20.  
The TDLC found that  there was ample evidence that Mr. Malone was the controller 
of VTR and because of this quality was aware of the conditions imposed in 2004 and 
that while remaining VTR controller and knowing the condition affecting VTR, he 
acquired and maintained until now shares of DirecTV Chile. Despite being warned of 
the wrongfulness of such conduct by the FNE when the investigation was initiated, 
he continued to infringe the conditions imposed. His conduct not only affected the 
legality of the 2004 merger but also generated adverse market effects. It enabled a 
company with a dominant position in the cable TV market to influence, through a 
common controller, its competitor, DirecTV. The offence reported VTR important 
economic benefits since it strengthened VTR’s dominant position in the market. The 
offence was maintained for almost three years. The Tribunal, however, noted that 
Mr. Malone was not a repeated offender. Consequently, the TDLC imposed a fine of 
UTA 4,000.  
 
Fine reduced by the Supreme Court 
During the procedure, the Supreme Court proposed some guidelines for a 
conciliatory agreement to the parties (FNE and John Malone). The agreement was 
reached on April 2013 and included provisions that ensured the compliance with the 
2004 conditions. The agreement established in detail how and when Mr. Malone 
was going to sell its ownership in DirecTV. Also, Mr. Malone agreed to pay the FNE 
CLP 120 million (UTA 240/ USD 230.000) in order to cover the litigation costs. On 
the other hand, the FNE, taking into consideration that the settlement ensured 
compliance with the 2004 conditions, withdrew its claim to maintain the UTA 4,000 
fine imposed by the TDLC.   
The Final sentence was issued on June 201321. Considering the agreement and that 
the FNE declined to further pursue the payment of the fine, the Supreme Court 
decided to waive the fine imposed by the TDLC. The main reason expressed by the 
Supreme Court was the collaborative attitude of the defendant, which would indicate 
that he had no intention to infringe competition rules. As a starting point of the 
discussion, the Supreme Court commented on the function of fines in the 
enforcement of competition law in Chile: 
                                                          
20
  http://www.tdlc.cl/DocumentosMultiples/Sentencia_117_2011.pdf, 41. 
21
  http://www.tdlc.cl/DocumentosMultiples/Sentencia_117_Corte_Suprema.pdf, 5. 
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Paragraph 6: “[…] it is useful to state that in competition law, 
including Chile, the fine appears to be the main form of sanction. In 
the discussion of the objectives of the sanctions, among others, 
factors of retribution and deterrence are usually mentioned. The 
retributive functions seek[] for the offender to receive his just 
punishment for the crime committed, while deterrence is looking to 
deter, discourage and prevent both the offender and other persons 
from committing offenses”.  
The Supreme Court found that a consultation regarding an exchange of shares 
made by one of the companies of the VTR group demonstrated that John Malone 
had voluntarily tried to request an opinion of the TDLC before the FNE’s 
investigation. Therefore, it demonstrated that the defendant had no intent to engage 
in anti-competitive behaviour22. This argument of the defendant had been rejected 
by the TDLC since the company that made the consultation had no relation with 
John Malone at that time, and because the consultation was declared inadmissible 
and not even reviewed by the authorities.  Nevertheless, the Court stated that the 
fine applied to John C. Malone appeared unnecessary and did not meet its purpose, 
since in the Supreme Court’s view, the activities of the defendant, namely, the 
voluntary notification to the TDLC of the merger as well as agreeing to meet the 
2004 conditions, suggested a collaborative behaviour and a commitment to 
competition law23. 
 
 
7. 
FNE'S COMPLAINT  
vs.  TECUMSEH DO 
BRASIL LTDA. et al. 
DECISION 122 
Collusio
n 
Industr
ial 
29-07-
2010 
29-06-
2012 
Reduced (-52%) 
 
In this case the fine is reduced 52%. Surprisingly, the Supreme Court did not make a 
thorough assessment of the criteria used to reduce the amount of the fine, relying 
primarily on prudential considerations. The Supreme Court argued that a lower fine 
also met the deterrence and retribution objectives of fines in competition law. 
 
Summary of the case 
In 2010, the FNE filed a complaint against Whirlpool S.A. and Tecumseh Do Brasil 
Ltda., the main providers of low power, hermetic compressors for the manufacturing 
                                                          
22
 Supreme Court’s judgment, para 8. 
23
 Supreme Court’s judgment, para 9. 
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of refrigerators, which have been participating in an international cartel since 2004. 
As a result of the cartel, prices increased more than 80% between 2004 and 2008. 
This also resulted in higher prices for refrigerators in the Chilean market (this input 
represents about 20% of the refrigerators’ total cost). Both companies were fined in a 
number of jurisdictions.  
The case is of particular interest for Chilean competition law, as it constitutes the first 
case in Chile in which the tribunal made use of the leniency program for the 
detection of cartels, hence representing a milestone in the history of cartel 
persecution in Chile. In particular, Tecumseh constitutes the first company that met 
the legal requirement to be exempted from any fines. The TDLC ruled unanimously 
against the two companies and fined Whirlpool for the sum of UTA 10,500 
(approximately US$ 10 million) plus legal expenses. 
 
Fine requested by the FNE 
The FNE requested a fine of 15,000 UTA24. During the trial process, the FNE 
submitted to the TDLC an economic report that justified the amount of fine requested 
on the basis of the estimation of the excess gains obtained by the cartel25.  
The estimation of excess gains required the determination of the duration of the 
cartel as well as the overprice charged during the price-fixing period. Tecumseh fully 
collaborated with information and data, as opposed to Whirlpool, who delivered 
inexact and incomprehensive data, impossible for use in the analysis. As a result, 
the FNE relied exclusively on the Tecumseh data and used extrapolation to draw 
results on Whirlpool.  
 
The duration of the cartel was determined by qualitative information obtained by 
Tecumseh, according to which the cartel dated back to the beginning of 2004 and 
terminated around February of 2009.  
For the determination of a counterfactual, it was assumed that after the termination 
of the agreement the two firms returned gradually towards more competitive levels 
until December 2009, by which time the market had fully returned to competitive 
conditions. Excess gains were then estimated using the profit margin of December 
2009 as a counterfactual.  The excess profits were then estimated as the real profits 
obtained by the two firms minus the profits that would have been obtained had 
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http://www.tdlc.cl/DocumentosMultiples/Requerimiento%20de%20la%20FNE%20contra%20Tecu
mseh% 
20Do%20Brasil%20Ltda.%20y%20otro.pdf 
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http://www.tdlc.cl/DocumentosMultiples/Informe%20Econ%C3%B3mico%20Paula%20Rold%C3
%A1n% 
20y%20Francisco%20Caravia%20(FNE).pdf 
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margins been at the level of December 2009. The use of profit margins instead of 
prices for the estimation of the cartel’s profits addressed Whirlpool’s defence that 
associated the high prices during the period of collusion to the rising cost of 
essential inputs for the production of compressors, such as iron. Finally the cartel 
profits were calculated by adding the actual profits obtained by the two firms during 
the cartel, and then by subtracting the profits that it would have earned had margins 
been at the December 2009 level.    
Overall, it is estimated that margins were varying between 100% and 140%, during 
collusion, far in excess of the 33% observed in December 2009. According to the 
above, Tecumseh gained the sum of CLP 4.4 billion, or approximately USD 8.5 
million.  
Excess profits for Whirlpool were estimated by means of proportionality using the 
average market share of Whirlpool for the period of 2004-2009, which was at 58%.  
This brought excess profits at CLP 7.2 billion, or USD 14 million. The FNE then 
requested a fine equal to the excess gain obtained by the cartel, amounting to 
approximately UTA 15,000.  
 
Fine imposed by the TDLC 
The TDLC considered that the cartel and its effects were proven and sentenced 
Whirlpool to pay a fine of UTA 10,50026. The fine is lower than the one proposed by 
the FNE. Even if the TDLC used similar steps than the FNE to estimate Whirlpool’s 
cartel benefits, it made some changes in the formula that diminished the final 
amount. In the first place, the FNE considered as a profit margin benchmark 
Tecumseh’s margin of September 2009. The TDLC, on the other hand, considered 
Tecumseh’s average profit margin in the last four months of 2009, which led to a 
higher benchmark. In addition, the TDLC considered that the collusive agreement 
had only started in January 2005 and not in 2004, as the FNE argued. Thus, with 
these modifications of the FNE’s calculations, the TDLC imposed a lower fine.   
 
Reduction of the fine by the Supreme Court 
Whirlpool brought the case before the Supreme Court27, which issued a judgement 
on September 2013. Among other things, Whirpoool claimed that the TDLC had no 
jurisdiction - because the cartel occurred outside of Chile - and that the infraction had 
already been punished (ne bis in idem principle). The Supreme Court rejected both 
arguments and added that “no foreign jurisdiction has considered or punished the 
events that occurred and had affected the domestic market.”  
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 http://www.tdlc.cl/DocumentosMultiples/Sentencia_122_2012.pdf, 56.  
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 http://www.tdlc.cl/DocumentosMultiples/Sentencia_122_Corte_Suprema.pdf, 32. 
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Regarding the fine, the Court expressly stated that it agreed with the amount of the 
fine imposed by the TDLC, considering that TDLC’s calculation aimed to estimate 
the benefits that the agreement would have generated for Whirlpool SA, and that 
calculation was not marred by any significant error. Furthermore, the Court found 
that the fine adequately reflected the seriousness of the offense and that, in order to 
be effective, the penalty had to serve as a deterrent instrument.  Nevertheless, after 
that statement, the Court considered that the deterrence and retribution objectives of 
fines sought in competition law would also be achieved if the fine was “reasonably” 
reduced. According to the Court, 
Paragraph 30:  […] Notwithstanding the above and even if this 
Supreme Court agree[s] that the amount of the fine imposed by the 
TDLC shows the seriousness of the offense and the fact that for a 
fine to be an effective deterrence instrument it needs to be sufficiently 
high in order to constitute a significant amount to the offender; this 
Supreme Court believes that the deterrent and retributive penalty 
function is fully satisfied with a reasonable decrease of the amount 
established by the decision under appeal. So, this Court will grant this 
request to the appellants.  
Consequently, the fine on Whirlpool was reduced from 10,500 to 5,000 UTA 
(approximately US$4.9 million).  
This decision surprised the Competition experts in Chile and initiated a discussion 
that was mainly centred on the lack of dissuasive effects of the Chilean fines in 
competition cases28. Some authors have criticized the perceived lack of motivation 
and inconsistency in the reduction of the fine in this case by the Supreme Court, 
arguing that it would have been appropriate to recall the level of penalties levied on 
Whirlpool in other jurisdictions for this international cartel29. Certainly, the size of 
Whirlpool’s market share was not the same in Chile, the size of the market was 
different, and the penalties were mostly the product of a settlement, yet their size 
was considerably larger than the level of the penalty accepted by the Supreme 
Court. For instance, in Brazil the penalty imposed was of the level of USD $ 53 
million, in the United States $ 49 million USD, and in Europe € 54 million. These 
fines are already reduced because Whirlpool had accepted responsibility, thus 
saving the social costs of litigation. This was not the case in Chile where Whirlpool 
opted to litigate, thus increasing the social costs of its conduct. A further objection to 
the approach followed by the Supreme Court in this case related to the need to 
ensure an optimal interaction between the level of penalties imposed and the design 
and operation of the leniency programme. It is necessary to impose on infringers 
severe penalties when acting illegally in order to enhance their ex ante incentives to 
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enter into leniency programmes. An important asymmetry should exist between the 
company that voluntarily gives information and cooperates (in this case Tecumseh), 
and those that took a negative stance on cooperation (in this case Whirlpool). The 
reduction in the fine granted by the Supreme Court reduced this asymmetry, 
weakening the proper functioning of the Chilean leniency programme.  
Other authors remarked that according to established practice, the fine should be at 
least equal to the economic benefit obtained from the cartel multiplied by the 
probability of detection30. However, the Supreme Court had proceeded in this case to 
a reduction of more than 50% of a fine representing the cartel profits that the same 
Court had considered were correctly calculated by the TDLC. According to these 
authors, the Supreme Court sent the wrong signal to the market that building a cartel 
does not really matter, since the fine will always be less than the economic benefit 
procured by such infringement. It was further argued that the lack of qualitative 
reasons to reduce the fine rendered the impact of the Supreme Court’s judgment in 
this case highly negative for the Chilean competition law system. First it gave the 
feeling that white collar crime was not appropriately sanctioned. Second, the 
judgment also adversely affected the predictability and certainty of the Chilean 
system of sanctions. It created a perverse incentive for the FNE and the plaintiffs to 
request higher fines since there is a high probability that they will be diminished by 
the Supreme Court. The same author argued that this case illustrates how important 
it would be for the courts to rely not only on qualitative criteria but also mechanisms 
enabling them quantitatively to determine the amount of the penalty. The TDLC had 
moved in this direction, but the Supreme Court annulled the effects of its effort. 
------ 
 
There have also been some rare cases in which the Supreme Court has increased 
the fines imposed. 
 
8. 
FNE'S COMPLAINT  
vs.  Transportes Central 
Ltda. y Otros, DECISION 
94. 
Collusio
n 
Transp
ort 
18-12-
2007 
29-12-
2010 
Increased 
 
Summary of case 
In 2008, the FNE filed a complaint against 9 minibuses transport companies and 4 
taxi transport companies that provided services in Osorno, a southern city of Chile. 
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The FNE argued that the companies had colluded and increased the transport fares, 
among other infringements.  
The TDLC found that 8 of the transport companies and the 4 taxi transport 
companies that provided services in Osorno had engaged in anticompetitive conduct 
by reaching an agreement to increase their fares. An interesting feature of this set of 
collusive practices was that they were orchestrated by the Regional Secretary of the 
Ministry of Transport.  
 
Fine requested by the FNE 
The FNE’s complaint was brief and requested a 100 UTA fine for the instigators of 
the agreement and a 50 UTA fine for the companies that were coerced to enter into 
the agreement31. There is no analysis of the benefits received by the companies and 
no economic reports were presented.  
 
Fine imposed by the TDLC 
On January 2010 the TDLC issued a judgement, holding that the cartel and its 
effects were proven32. For the purposes of determining the amount of the fine, the 
TDLC considered article 26.c DL No. 211, stating that the seriousness of the 
conduct, the economic benefit and previous offenses, should be taken into account.  
The TDLC found that the fares increase was of 50% for the minibuses and of 17% 
for the taxies, and that the fine should at least be equal to the economic benefit 
obtained by the involved companies. Nevertheless, the Tribunal noted that since the 
Regional Secretary of the Ministry of Transport induced the agreement, or at least 
helped to reach it, companies should not be heavily fined. Furthermore, some 
companies’ liability was alleviated since they were intimidated or forced  to sign the 
agreement. Finally, the Tribunal noted that the number of vehicles owned by every 
company should be taken into account when determining the fines. The TDLC 
decided to impose fines of UTA (Unidad Tributaria Annual) 12, 8, 7, 4, and 3 to the 
different transport companies according to the weighting of the abovementioned 
factors.  
 
Fine increased by the Supreme Court 
The transport companies and the FNE appealed and brought the case before the 
Supreme Court,33 which rejected the claims submitted by the transport companies 
and granted in part the FNE’s petition to increase the fines. The Supreme Court 
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found that collusion was the most serious of all anticompetitive behaviours. It also 
found that the circumstance of the Regional Secretary of the Ministry of Transport’s 
intervention could diminish the liability of the involved transport companies, but not in 
such a magnitude as that considered by the TDLC. Therefore, the Supreme Court 
increased the fine of 2 of the transport companies to UTA 50 and increased the fine 
of 3 of the transport companies to UTA 35.  
 
3. Proposals for reform 
 
In recent years, there has been considerable attention brought to the analysis of the 
fining policy of the FNE and the TDLC and the impact of the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence on the level of fines. A wide-ranging study, published in 2012, provides 
a thorough analysis of the fines imposed by the TDLC and the modifications brought 
by the Supreme Court’s judgments. The study includes tables comparing the 
imposed fines in the cases examined by the TDLC between 2008 and 2010. The 
study found that in the eight cases where a fine was imposed, and that was later 
reviewed by the Supreme Court, the latter has always modified the fine, increasing it 
in two occasions and diminishing it in six of them34.  
There are various reasons provided by the Supreme Court to alter the amount of 
fines imposed by the TDLC. One of the reasons commonly put forward, in at least 
three occasions, was that the considerations taken into account by the TDLC for 
determining the amount of the fine were not developed enough. Other reasons for 
lowering the amount of the fines related to the following factors: irreproachable past 
conduct of the defendant; proportionality; duration of the infringement; cooperative 
behaviour of the defendants; the fact that some aggravating circumstance was not 
applicable; that there was no information about the benefit obtained by the offence; 
and that the fine recommended by the FNE and accepted by the TDLC exceeded the 
maximum applicable by law at the time the infringement was done. The study 
showed that fines had been enforced in less than 28% of all the cases brought by 
the FNE until then35. The study also noted that the largest fine in Chile’s Competition 
Law history at the time (2010) was 40 % of the maximum allowed, and that the 
average amounted to 845 UTA. The medium was only UTA 95.5, equivalent to 0.5% 
of the maximum allowed. This information should be put into perspective if we 
consider that the Supreme Court has diminished fines by about 28% on average. 
The study further argued that if we take international comparisons into account, the 
maximum fine allowed in Chile was particularly low, although from a national 
perspective, it might be considered as substantially higher from those applicable in 
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the regulation of the banking sector, sanitary sector, electricity and fuel sector, 
telecommunications sector, securities and the insurance sector36. Yet, as it was 
remarked by the study, in view of the difficulty of detecting competition law 
infringements, such as secret cartels, the FNE has a considerable disadvantage in 
comparison with the regulatory authorities, active in the above sectors, thus 
explaining why the penalties should be set at a higher level.  
In July 2012, a committee of well-known academics37 issued a report, which was 
submitted to the former president, Mr. Piñera. The report made recommendations to 
modify some aspects of Chile’s competition law system. Regarding the issue of 
fines, the members of the Commission envisaged possibilities to improve the current 
system. The Commission recommended that the fines imposed on companies 
should be based on some kind of scale or indicator, since determining the caused 
damage or the obtained profits from the illicit practice may be a very difficult 
operation. Specifically, the Commission recommended that fines should be 
estimated according to a percentage of the company’s annual sales during the 
period of the infringement plus an amount that would act as a deterrent.  
 
The Commission noted that the maximum amount of fines was recently raised by the 
legal reform of 2009 from 20,000 to 30.000 UTA. However, in the view of the 
Commission, this adjustment has made no difference since imposed fines have been 
generally far under the maximum permitted amount. In particular, it did not send a 
signal regarding the negative impact of anticompetitive behaviour and the 
importance lawmakers attached to the increase of the level of fines. The 
Commission observed that in practice fines had not increased.  
 
The Commission also made other recommendations such as to include criminal 
sanctions for top executives of the involved firms with the prohibition of serving as 
directors in publicly traded companies, or in managing positions during a period of 5 
years. Criminal sanctions were recommended only by part of the Commission. In this 
matter opinions were divided.  
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C. A comparative perspective:  tour d' horizon of the practice of judicial 
scrutiny and the role of the courts in promoting effective competition law 
enforcement 
 
1. The EU level 
 
In Les Verts v. European Parliament, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) 
emphasized that the European Community is a community based on the rule of law, 
inasmuch as neither its Member states not its institutions can avoid judicial review of 
their actions to determine whether those actions are in conformity with the Treaty38. 
The control of legality exercised by the European judiciary of the measures adopted 
by the European institutions constitutes the cornerstone of this institutional 
framework.39 
There are two routes to contest the legality of the remedial action of the European 
Commission. First, Article 263 TFEU provides that the Court may review the legality 
of the decisions or acts of the Commission that are capable of affecting the interests 
of individuals. Challenges are made at first instance to the General Court of the 
EU,40 and appeals on points of law can be made from the General Court to the 
CJEU. Second, the judicial control of the appropriateness of the amount of fines is 
more intensive, following the interplay of Article 261 TFEU and of Article 31 of 
Regulation 1/2003. Pursuant to these provisions, the CJEU is endowed with 
unlimited jurisdiction to assess the appropriateness of, and if necessary to vary, 
downward or upward, the amount of the fine imposed by the Commission. Hence, it 
has judicial scrutiny over material errors of law, facts, procedural irregularities, 
unreasonable exercise of discretion, and, under certain circumstances, also over 
evaluative judgments and predictions of the European Commission. The Court is not 
able to impose a different fine but to rule on existing fines set by decisions of the 
Commission41.    
Concerning the possibilities of challenging the decisions of the European 
Commission, those to which the latter are directly addressed, together with third 
parties who can demonstrate “direct and individual concern” (such as, inter alia, 
competitors), may file an appeal with the General Court. The grounds of review are 
lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, 
infringement of the Treaty or any rule of law relating to its application, and misuse of 
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powers. The European Courts do not exercise a formal appellate jurisdiction on the 
merits, but a simple control of legality, although with regard to fines they may 
substitute their own assessment to that of the European Commission. Yet, as we 
have previously noted, this is limited to the grounds of the Commission’s decision 
that were found illegal. 
The intensity of review  is traditionally a limited one under Article 263 TFEU.  The 
General Court cannot “remake” the Commission’s decision or inquire on the merits of 
it, but it can only verify whether the Commission has produced sufficiently precise 
and coherent proof to support its case, whether it has misinterpreted or misapplied 
the law, or has made a “manifest error of appraisal” in the statement of the facts or 
the assessment of the evidence before it, so that the latter cannot support its 
conclusions as to the nature—whether unlawful or otherwise--of the practice42. 
However, since its creation in 1989, the General Court has intensified the judicial 
control of the Commission’s decisions, as it is now possible to conduct a systematic 
examination of the factual basis of the decision of the Commission. The CJEU 
focuses more on questions of law than questions of facts. However, the General 
Court has traditionally not interfered with the exercise by the Commission of complex 
economic and technical appraisals unless there is a manifest error.43 Some 
observers are of the view that the General Court varies the intensity of judicial review 
across the judicial control exercised in applications of Article 101(1), 101(3), 102, or 
merger control. Others interpret the recent Court cases to indicate that the intensity 
of judicial review has been raised to, in substance, full judicial review across the 
board. Since the annulment of the three merger decisions Schneider, Tetra Laval 
and Airtours,44 the General Court pays only lip service to the marginal review 
standard, and in substance exercises full judicial review of infringement decisions.45 
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The review has been “rigorous” (in particular for mergers and Article 101(3)46, as well 
as in Article 102 cases).47 In other recent cases, however, the European Court of 
Justice has supported and emphasized the wide degree of discretion of the 
European Commission, for example in the adoption of commitment decisions under 
Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 (negotiated remedies), by applying differently the 
principle of proportionality in this context than for decisions adopted under Article 7 
(imposed remedies)48. Upon annulment, the case is remitted to the Commission for a 
fresh examination of the issues or evidence. 
The intensity of review under Article 261 TFEU is a higher one. The General Court 
has not shied away from subjecting the Commission’s decisions on fines to strict 
scrutiny, in view of the “unlimited jurisdiction” it disposes with regard to penalties. 
The scope of this “unlimited jurisdiction” was exposed by the CJEU as being 
relatively broad, the EU judicature being “empowered to exercise its unlimited 
jurisdiction where the question of the amount of the fine is before it”49. Yet, the 
“unlimited jurisdiction” from which the General Court benefits may be subject to 
various interpretations. Commenting on the meaning in practice of the term, former 
President of the General Court, Bo Vesterdorf observed the following: 
“Even if Article 23(3) of Regulation 1/2003 only indicates that the elements to 
be taken into consideration in calculating the fine are gravity and duration, it 
follows clearly from the case-law that the Commission, and therefore certainly 
also the Community Courts, must consider all relevant facts and 
circumstances of the case […] which must include the overall general fairness 
of the sanction on view of all the general circumstances of any particular case. 
The unlimited jurisdiction granted to the Community Courts under Article 31 of 
Regulation 1/2003 and Article [261 TFEU] permits them to perform precisely 
this type of assessment. In view of the ever increasing level of fines imposed 
by the Commission, fines which now may amount to more than one billion 
Euros on a single undertaking and who knows how much more next time […] 
it is my humble submission that it is not so much necessary that the 
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Community Courts fully exercise their unlimited jurisdiction and not just verify 
if the Guidelines have been correctly followed by the Commission”50. 
 
The approach followed by the EU Courts has been variable. The General Court has 
proceeded to an intensive scrutiny of the Commission’s decision, eventually 
substituting its own interpretation of the law, when they found that the Commission’s 
decision was based on errors of law. For instance, in view of Article 23(3) of 
Regulation 1/2003, the Commission is bound to take into account both the gravity 
and the duration of the infringement. In addition, the Commission has adopted 
Guidelines binding its own discretion, in view of the principle of legitimate 
expectations, with the aim to ensure greater legal certainty for undertakings. The 
Court thus makes sure that the legal framework of Regulation 1/2003 is respected, 
as well as general principles of EU law (e.g. proportionality), while it also interferes 
with the methodology adopted by the Commission in a specific case, if this does not 
comply with the methodology advanced by the Commission in its Guidelines, 
according to the principles of EU administrative law51.  
With regard to errors of facts or unreasonable exercise of discretion, the General 
Court has been attentive to situations such as that in GDF-Suez, in which the 
General Court reduced the fine as the Commission had not established to the 
requisite legal standard the duration of part of the infringement. The Court reduced 
the fine, but not according to the Commission’s methodology, as this would have led 
to a “greatly disproportionate” reduction “to the relative importance of the error which 
has been found to exist”, as this would have resulted in a reduction of the fine of 
more than 50%52. 
Although the Court has mentioned in several occasions that in exercising its 
unlimited jurisdiction, “it must make its own appraisal, taking account of all the 
circumstances of the case”, it has been relatively reluctant to depart from the 
methodology set out in the Commission’s Guidelines53. For instance, the Court 
referred to the 2006 Guidelines of the European Commission and the Commission’s 
previous decisional practice as useful “guidance” in order to calculate the fine54. 
Although it is clear that the EU Courts do not consider these Guidelines binding on 
them, they have, on certain occasions held that they may have to rely on the 
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methodology set forth when reviewing the fine, as the exercise of unlimited 
jurisdiction cannot result in discrimination between undertakings which have 
participated in anticompetitive conduct55. According to some commentators, “(i)n 
recent judgments this standard of review seems to be interpreted by the Court as 
[…] ensuring that the considerations which the Commission relied on are ‘coherent 
and objectively justified’, which implied that ‘the Courts must not immediately 
substitute their own assessment for that of the Commission’; or as controlling that 
the fine is proportionate to the gravity and duration of the infringement and weighing 
the gravity of the infringement and the circumstances invoked by the applicant”56. It 
is not clear which are the limits of the discretion that the Commission is offered, in 
the presence of a complex economic and technical appraisal. Most would agree that 
the “policymaking discretion” of the Commission should be protected; yet, what 
about “executing discretion”? According to some commentators, “it is doubtful that, 
for instance, granting a reduction of the fine to an undertaking which benefits from 
the leniency procedure by taking into consideration only the timing, as opposed to 
the usefulness and quality of the information, requires any complex assessments”57. 
In any case, the powers of review are ostensibly confined to a “manifest error”-type 
review when the appeal relates to the complex economic and legal assessment of 
the findings made by the Commission as to the nature and impact of the alleged 
infringement58.  The General Court has explained in a number of judgments that the 
limited nature of this scrutiny is justified by the need to preserve the “inter-
institutional balance” within the Union and especially to prevent the Courts from 
encroaching upon the discretionary powers of the Commission in the area of 
competition policy59. This is also the case in the context of setting fines. On several 
occasions, the Court held that the Commission enjoyed a “wide margin of discretion 
when setting the amount of fines”60. The judicial control exercised in areas in which 
the Commission maintains discretion, such as “the starting amount of a fine or the 
uplift for duration” is limited to ascertaining that the Commission has not committed a 
manifest error61. 
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It could be argued that the General Court, despite being able to consider the extent 
to which the Commission provided a sufficiently clear and exhaustive statement of 
reasons in respect to the “necessity” of the amount of the fine in each case, remains 
constrained in its ability to appraise its suitability in light of the nature/gravity of the 
infringement and its duration.  However, although it is acknowledged that the review 
powers of the EU Courts are limited to a “manifest error” type of review in cases 
involving complex economic appraisals, it should be noted that in some recent 
cases, the Court of Justice prescribed rigorous standards of judicial review for the 
decisions of the Commission by the General Court and established its full jurisdiction 
to review decisions in which the Commission imposes fines. In particular, the Court 
held that “the Courts cannot use the Commission's margin of discretion - either as 
regards the choice of factors taken into account in the application of the criteria 
mentioned in the Guidelines (of the Commission) […] or as regards the assessment 
of those factors - as a basis for dispensing with the conduct of an in-depth review of 
the law and of the facts”.62 
Yet, limits relating to the different functions of competition authorities and courts 
exercising a judicial review may limit judicial scrutiny of complex economic 
assessments63. The Commission is offered some “degree of latitude” as to the 
choice of interpretation of the economic elements that it takes into account in its 
decisions, “provided that those choices are not manifestly contrary to the accepted 
rules of economic discipline and are not applied inconsistently”64. It is on the 
applicant to put forward reasons that the Commission’s effort “was not based on 
sound economics”65. 
In the context of the exercise by the General Court of an unlimited jurisdiction on 
fines, it was suggested that “in practice […] the case-law gives the European 
Commission significant leeway in the calculation of fines”66. First, the basic amount 
of the fine, which is related to the value of sales, depends on the gravity of the 
infringement, the latter being determined by reference to numerous factors, such as 
“the particular circumstances of the case, its context and the dissuasive effect of 
fines”, “no binding or exhaustive list of the criteria which must be applied” having 
been drawn up67. The Commission may thus be free to interpret the individual 
circumstances of the case and depart from its previous practice, if this is not part of 
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the legal framework68. Accordingly, the Commission may impose penalties at a 
higher level than the ones it has imposed in the past for certain categories of 
infringements, if raising the fines is considered necessary in order to ensure the 
implementation of competition policy and the objective of general prevention69. For 
instance, the General Court has only proceeded to a limited review of the multiplier 
applied to reflect the duration of the infringement, accepting that its “review of the 
lawfulness of the exercise of the Commission’s discretion in the matter must confine 
itself to checking that the thresholds set are coherent and objectively justified and the 
Courts must not immediately substitute their own assessment for that of the 
Commission”70. 
The Commission benefits from a considerable margin of appreciation with regard to 
the individualization of the fine, in particular when it decides whether or not to take 
into account mitigating or aggravating circumstances. For instance, in order to 
determine the existence of aggravating circumstances, the Commission may take 
into account various factors, such as the nature of the infringement, the market share 
of the undertakings concerned, etc., the control of the General Court being limited to 
whether the Commission has departed from the methodology of the Guidelines, has 
proceeded to an increase that is “manifestly disproportionate”, or has refused to take 
into account other factors, such as the financial losses of the undertaking71. Similarly, 
with regard to mitigating circumstances, the Commission has been granted a degree 
of latitude in making the overall assessment of the extent to which a reduction of 
fines may be made72. The General Court has carried out, for instance, a limited 
review of the assessment made by the Commission of the cooperation provided by 
undertakings in order to benefit from the reduction of the fine73. In addition, the 
General Court has recognized the Commission’s discretion in calculating the 
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deterrent effect of the fine, exercising a limited review in this case74. Judicial scrutiny 
is also limited in the context of the appreciation by the Commission of the quality and 
usefulness of the cooperation provided by the undertaking, the Commission enjoying 
some discretion when considering the application of leniency, in particular by 
reference to the contributions made by other undertakings75. Only an obvious error of 
appraisal may be censured, the complainant having to show that in the absence of 
the information provided, the Commission would not have been able to prove the 
infringement. 
In a recent wide-ranging statistical analysis of the judicial review of the Commission’s 
decisions before the European Court of Justice and the General Court in the period 
of 2001-2005, Tridimas and Gari observe that out of 344 actions for annulment 
launched before the General court (then named CFI) during the period 2001-2005, 
98 were contested competition decisions (28.8%) and 57 (16,8%) contested state 
aids76. According to the authors, “(a)ctions lodged against competition measures are 
the most likely to succeed with a rate of success of 44.9 per cent”, the measure of 
success being the total or partial annulment of the decision or the revision of the 
fine77. These findings may indicate that judicial oversight of the European 
Commission’s decisions in competition law has an impact on competition law 
enforcement and does not constitute a mere formal rubber stamping exercise, 
despite the considerable discretion given the Commission in complex economic and 
technical appraisals78. This is particularly so in view of the intensive judicial scrutiny 
exercised over the amount of the fine imposed by the Commission. 
A recent empirical study of Camesasca, Ywesyn, Weck and Bowman (2013) has 
delved into the cartel precedents of both the General Court and the Court of Justice 
in the period January 1998 through September 2012, which included 200 General 
Court judgments and 69 Court of justice judgments79. The appeals had been lodged 
against 75 Commission investigations, some of which related to re-adoptions of 
annulled decisions. Camesasca et al found that “Commission decisions are upheld 
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on appeal, save for rare exceptions”80. For instance, out of the 660 pleas directed 
against fines, only 59 were successful, that is less than 10%. Among those that 
succeeded most often, Camesasca et al cited those challenging the proportionality of 
the infringement duration (23%), those claiming discrimination (17%), or a 
misapplication of the Leniency Notice (13%). In contrast, pleas challenging the 
assessment by the Commission of turnover, gravity and mitigating circumstances, 
“succeeded only where the appellant could show some discriminatory element in the 
Commission’s fining decision”81. The success rate was even lower at the Court of 
Justice of the EU, as only one plea (concerning the misapplication of the Leniency 
Notice) was successful out of the 85 put forward all these years82. However, the 
number of successful pleas may not be the best measure for the level of judicial 
scrutiny. Of the total number of 510 individual appeals in the sample in Camesasca 
et al., only approximately 200 had been ruled on by the European courts. In 104 
cases, the fine was upheld by the GC, and in 69 cases by the Court of Justice. In 31 
appeals, the fine was annulled by either the General Court (29) or the CJEU (2). In 
69 further cases, the fine was reduced (in 67 cases by the General Court, in two 
cases by the CJEU). It should be noted, however, that many of the reductions of the 
fine were only modest. 
A similar self-restraint may be observed with regard to the control exercised by the 
CJEU on the judgments of the General Court. The CJEU recognizes that it should 
not substitute its own assessment on grounds of fairness for that of the General 
Court when the latter exercises its unlimited jurisdiction to rule on the amount of fines 
imposed on undertakings for infringements of European Union law83. Hence, “only 
inasmuch as the Court of Justice considers that the level of the penalty is not merely 
inappropriate, but also excessive to the point of being disproportionate, would it have 
to find that the General Court erred in law, due to the inappropriateness of the 
amount of a fine”84. 
It has been argued that given the broadly “criminal nature” of these infringements the 
EU Courts should be empowered to exert  more stringent control over the lawfulness 
of antitrust decisions, so as to encompass all matters of law and fact concerning 
each case,  and, therefore, to have the discretion to take a “fresh look” at cases.85  It 
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is suggested that the European Convention on Human Rights constitutes perhaps 
the most significant factor in the current pressure for the development of stricter 
standards of judicial review.   
 
Already in its Nold judgment the Court of Justice had recognised that although the 
Convention was not a part of Community law, it played a key role as a “source of 
inspiration” in shaping the standards of protection of fundamental rights enshrined in 
the general principles of EC law.86 However, the Court emphasised that these 
standards were autonomous from both the domestic legal traditions of the Member 
States and the Convention itself, and consequently would have to be “subject to 
certain limits justified by the overall objectives pursued by the Community”.87   
Consequently, a question emerges as to whether EU law strikes a “fair balance” 
between the need to secure due process tights and the interest to the effective 
functioning of the EU institutions, so that the former are not impaired in their 
essence.88 The issue is of particular salience now, since the Treaty of Lisbon makes 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights legally binding, and with it the “minimum” 
level of protection provided by the Convention to rights and freedoms that are 
common to both instruments.89  The Treaty also creates the legal basis for the Union 
to accede to the ECHR, thus paving the way for the former to become subject to the 
jurisdiction and the oversight of the Strasbourg Court.   
 
According to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), 
everyone has the right to a “fair hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law” in all proceedings that are decisive for the “determination of civil 
rights and obligations or of a criminal charge”.  Although none of the Convention 
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norms lay down specific “administrative fairness” standards applicable to 
proceedings before non-judicial authorities, the Court adopted a substantive test to 
determine whether the exercise of administrative powers by public authorities could 
be considered as falling within the scope of Article 6(1),.90   
Thus, the Strasbourg Court took the view that the existence of a “criminal charge” 
should be dependent on substantive factors, namely “the nature and severity of the 
offence and the penalty,” and “the purpose of the fine”, i.e. whether the latter “was 
both deterrent and punitive (…).”91  Similarly, as regards the interpretation of the 
concept of a “determination of civil rights and obligations”, it was held in the 
LeCompte, Van Leuven and DeMeyere judgment that the French term “‘contestation’ 
(dispute)… (…) should be given a substantive rather than formal meaning”:92 Article 
6(1) ECHR should therefore be applicable to all proceedings, be they judicial or 
administrative, whose “result (…) [is] directly decisive”93 for the existence or the 
exercise of a substantive right.94   
This approach was applied to define the nature, for Convention purposes, of 
competition proceedings in domestic law.  In Stenuit,95 the now defunct European 
Commission on Human Rights stated that, in consideration of the “nature of the 
offence”, the enforcement of French competition law nevertheless possessed a 
“criminal aspect…for the purpose of the Convention”.96  The Human Rights 
Commission pointed to a “combination of concordant factors”97 including the goal of 
the provisions, which was “to maintain free competition within the French market”,98 
their general scope of application,99 and the deterrent nature of the penalty provided 
for those responsible, i.e. 5% of their total annual revenue.100   
The recognition that competition proceedings possess a “criminal character” or a 
“quasi-criminal” dimension has important implications for the “due process” rules 
applicable within the EU enforcement framework. An important discussion is 
currently raging on the compatibility of the structural characteristics of the 
competition framework in the EU legal system with the Convention of Human Rights, 
in particular whether an “integrated agency” such as the European Commission, and 
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the judicial stage of the proceedings to which it is subject, fulfils the requirements of 
“fairness” provided by the Convention. 
 
According to the Strasbourg Court, providing that their decision was open to the 
scrutiny of a full court of law in respect to all matters of fact and law,101 administrative 
bodies could pursue and punish those responsible for “penal” infringements102. As a 
result, it is argued that the existence of the jurisdiction of the General Court to review 
the Commission’s decisions could make the EU system fully compatible with Article 
6 ECHR103. Although the CJEU has not taken directly a position as to the 
compatibility of the EU enforcement regime with Article 6, it has held that the system 
is compatible with the principle of effective judicial protection laid down in Article 47 
EUCFR. According to the CJEU, this princiople “implements in European Union law 
the protection afforded by Article 6(1) of the ECHR”, since the review process before 
the Courts of the Union “in fact involves review of both the law and the facts, and 
means that they have the power to assess the evidence, to annul the contested 
decision and to alter the amount of fines”104. The Court also held that “the unlimited 
jurisdiction conferred on the General Court in relation to fines by the Treaty and by 
European Union legislation, which enables it to substitute its own assessment of the 
fine for that of the Commission, goes beyond what is necessary for the purpose of 
compliance with the ECHR, since the latter simply requires the Court to be able to 
establish whether there are errors of fact”105. 
 
Furthermore, although fines have increased in aggregate, some recent studies on 
the European Commission’s cartel fines found that these were considerably less 
than provided for in the 2006 Guidelines and that the average fine per firm has 
declined significantly since 2007106. It was also argued that the European Court of 
Human Rights, which developed the “substantive approach” to the determination of 
the nature—criminal or civil—of penalties, drew a distinction between “criminal 
offences” that belong to the “hard core of criminal law,” and those infringements 
which do not meet the same degree of gravity, and therefore lie outside that 
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“core”107.  Thus, it was suggested that in cases concerning infringements of the latter 
kind the safeguards enshrined in Article 6 of the Convention and expressly 
applicable to “criminal” cases should not apply with the same stringency as in 
proceedings affecting natural persons accused of “hard core” criminal offences.  
 
Yet concerns have been expressed, even by the members of the CJEU. In a recent, 
non-binding, yet strongly worded Opinion to the Court, Advocate General (AG) 
Wathelet called on the General Court to exercise fully its unlimited jurisdiction when 
reviewing the proportionality of fines. AG Wathelet referred to both Article 47 TFEU 
and the ECHR noting that the General Court’s assessment should be sufficiently 
independent from that of the Commission, in that the General Court may neither 
solely refer to the amount set by the Commission – in a relatively arbitrary fashion, 
[…] for the basic amount – nor feel bound by the Commission’s calculations or the 
circumstances that the Commission had taken into account108. He lamented the fact 
that too often the General Court has limited itself to assessing whether the 
Commission applied its own Fining Guidelines correctly, despite the General Court 
not itself being bound by those Guidelines109. Furthermore, the AG observed that the 
General Court should not refer anymore to the “large” or “substantial” margin of 
appreciation of the Commission in the setting of fines, but should make an in-depth 
legal and factual review of the fine by carrying out, itself, the assessment of whether 
the fine imposed was proportionate, and by checking that all the relevant elements 
were actually taken into account110. It remains to be seen if the CJEU will follow the 
proposals of the Advocate General. 
Interesting as it is, the debate over the compatibility of the European enforcement 
regime with the high standards of due process included in the European Convention 
of Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, remains, 
however, of limited practical utility beyond the EU, and in particular for Chile, 
although it may offer interesting insights on the difficult compromises that 
administrative enforcement systems face, in comparison to the prosecutorial system 
chosen by the Chilean legislator in order to balance effectiveness and the need for 
an optimal sanctions system, from one side, and justice/proportional sanctions, from 
the other. The EU has opted for an administrative enforcement system in which 
increasingly high penalties are imposed following an inquisitorial process within the 
same administrative institution, the European Commission, which benefits from an 
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important “policymaking” and “executing” discretion. Moreover, the judicial scrutiny 
exercised by the General Court, although unlimited in principle, falls short of that 
performed in the context of a de novo review. The Court of Justice of the EU 
performs only a limited control of the judgments of the General Court for errors of 
law. This peculiar enforcement structure contrasts with the adversarial and 
prosecutorial model of enforcement that was chosen in Chile. Contrary to the 
European Commission, the FNE cannot impose any penalties but submits its request 
to an independent specialised tribunal, which has full jurisdiction to set the 
appropriate level of penalties, following an extensive adversarial process. The 
Tribunal exercises full scrutiny of the law and facts, as would a normal trial court 
judging in first instance would have done. The decision may be appealed to the 
Supreme Court which can scrutinize both errors of law and fact. The relatively low 
level of fines imposed by the TDLC (also in view of the low legislative threshold), and 
the primary role the judiciary plays in the enforcement of competition law in Chile, 
indicate that due process issues are not likely to arise in the foreseeable future111.    
 
2. The national level 
 
The new legal exception regime adopted by Regulation 1/2003 established a system 
where the burden of competition law enforcement is shared between the 
Commission and national competition authorities of EU Member States. National 
competition authorities act on their own initiative, or following a complaint, and have 
the power to require that the infringement is brought to an end, to order interim 
measures, to accept commitments, and to impose fines, periodic penalty payments, 
or any other penalty provided for in their national law112. The Member States are free 
to determine which body will enforce the EU competition law provisions and the 
procedure and mechanisms for investigations and for the enforcement of the 
decisions reached113. The Member States may allocate different powers and 
functions to those different national authorities, whether administrative or judicial.114. 
 
There is a considerable variety of institutional structures across the EU and although 
the trend is towards some degree of convergence with the EU administrative-centred 
model, Member States remain free to choose the institutional format for their national 
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competition agencies, which could also be judicial organs. One could distinguish 
between  
 
(i) purely administrative enforcement model, which constitutes the dominant 
enforcement system in Europe. This sytem involves either a single 
independent administrative authority that conducts both the investigation 
and the adjudicatory function115, or an administrative enforcement system 
with a dual structure, where the investigation and adjudicatory functions 
are more or less separated from each other and exercised by different 
bodies within the same NCA. Most often this involves the adjudicatory 
function of a college of commissioners.116 The decisions can also be 
subject to some form of judicial control. 
 
(ii) mixed enforcement system model, where the investigation and adjudicatory 
functions are shared between the administration (a competition authority 
or a government department), which conducts the investigation, and a 
judicial organ (of an administrative117, civil118 or criminal119 nature), which 
exercises the adjudicative function.  
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exercises the adjudicatory function) and Sweden  (the investigation being at the hands of the Konkurrenvertsket 
and the adjudicatory function being exercised by the Tribunal of Stockholm). 
119
 This is the institutional model chosen by Denmark (where the Konkurrencestyrel or Ministry of 
economics is the investigating body but the final decision is taken by a criminal judge), Estonia 
(where the investigation is conducted by the Estonian Institute of competition, which is part of the 
Ministry of Economics, the final decision being taken by a criminal judge) and Ireland (where the 
investigation is conducted by the Irish Competition Authority, the final decision being taken by 
either the High Court – for civil court cases – or for hardcore restrictions by the Central Criminal 
Court, after the case has been presented to the Director of public prosecutions. The same system 
is also chosen by the UK, when enforcing the cartel offence under the Enterprise Act 2002 with 
the OFT investigating, the Serious Fraud Office acting as the prosecutor and the magistrates’ 
court (summary trial) or the Crown Court (trial on indictment) adjudicating. 
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The decisions of the competition authorities are subject to judicial control120, either 
before courts, which can be a generalist court with exclusive competence to hear all 
competition appeals,121 or before a specialised tribunal in competition or economic 
litigation122. The judicial control might take different forms: it might be a limited 
judicial review of the legality of the decision,123 or involve a full jurisdictional (appeal) 
process124. An additional layer of judicial control of the review or appeal decisions 
may occur at a higher level of jurisdiction, which in some cases comprises a 
specialised chamber in competition litigation125. We will explore the judicial scrutiny 
exercised on the setting of penalties in some key EU jurisdictions. 
 
a. United Kingdom 
 
The remedies and penalties imposed by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), recently 
replaced by the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), with regard to the 
application of Articles 101, 102 and their national equivalents (Chapter I and II of the 
Competition Act 1998), are all subject to a full merits (appellate) review in front of a 
specialised Tribunal, the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT)126. The process is close 
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 For a useful summary see, Roseau, M. (2007) “Panorama des procédures d’appel contre les 
décisions des ANC en Europe”, Concurrences 2, 209-218.  
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 See, for instance, Austria (Antitrust Court of Appeal), Denmark (Competition Court of appeal), 
Finland (Market Court), Spain (Defence of Competition Tribunal for the decisions of the Service 
for the protection of competition and the Audiencanacional for the decisions of the Defence of 
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the Court of Stockholm for the decisions of the Market Court), Poland (Competition and 
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 See, for instance, Belgium (with the exception of the ministerial decisions for mergers where the 
Council of State exercises a control of legality), Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Slovenia Sweden, , UK (with the exception of 
merger decisions for which it is a judicial review), Portugal. 
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 See, for instance, in Germany (where the Federal Court of Justice comprises a specialised 
chamber in antitrust litigation) or in the Netherlands (the Dutch Trade and Industry Appeals 
Tribunal). 
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 The Tribunal was established by the Enterprise Act 2002 (Section 12 and Schedule 2). The CAT does not 
have inherent jurisdiction as the High Court (whose jurisdiction is established by precedent) but a statutory 
jurisdiction, its standards of review being based on statutory law. Section 46(1) and (2) of the Competition Act 
1998 provide that any party to an agreement in respect of which the OFT has made a decision, or any person in 
respect of whose conduct the OFT has made a decision, may appeal to the CAT ‘against, or with respect to, the 
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to a quasi-adversarial model, where the decisions of the OFT, or now the CMA, are 
subject to strict and intensive scrutiny in law, facts, and policy, the CAT having the 
authority to substitute its assessment to that of the CMA. The intensity of judicial 
control exercised over remedies and penalties is particularly strong, in comparison to 
the situation in the EU generally.  
In a full merits (appeal) review, the CAT proceeds to extensive findings of fact in 
cases where the evidence relied on by the CMA is challenged, very often on the 
basis of extensive new material introduced by the appellant, and rebuttal evidence 
introduced by the CMA127. However, the Tribunal exercises an appellate function and 
cannot proceed to the same analysis of the factual record as a court (or a regulator) 
would do in the first instance. The fact that it is an (appellate) review (and not a 
review de novo), limits to an extent the factual record submitted by the parties, and 
thus examined by the authority128. Hence, some weight will still be provided to the 
analysis performed by the relevant competition authority in the first instance129. As 
some commentators have explained, ‘when the decision under challenge is a multi-
faceted policy decision, the CAT is more likely to allow the legitimate judgment of the 
regulator to stand, unless it can be shown that there is some error in the basis for 
that judgment’130. In contrast to judicial review or to the ordinary approach of an 
appellate court, the CAT is, however, willing in an appeal to determine disputes of 
primary fact, and proceeds more frequently than other appellate courts to cross-
examination of witnesses131. This might seem, at first sight, to blur the distinction 
between an appeal process and an examination of the facts of the case at first 
instance. The appellate process certainly involves the rehearing of a case, but the 
content of such a rehearing is something that depends on a variety of factors. Writing 
in the context of an appeals process to the decision of a court at first instance, Mary 
L.J., noted that: 
The review will engage the merits of the appeal. It will accord appropriate 
respect to the decision of the lower court. Appropriate respect will be 
tempered by the nature of the lower court and its decision-making process. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
decision’. Such decisions may also be made by the various sectoral regulators pursuant to the competition 
jurisdictions they hold concurrently with the OFT. Schedule 8 provides for two different types of review 
depending on the type of decision under appeal. In most cases, according to paragraph 3(1) of the Schedule, the 
CAT ‘must determine the appeal on the merits by reference to the grounds of appeal set out in the notice of 
appeal’. 
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 M.E. Burgess, J.J. Burgess & S.J. Burgess v. OFT, [2005] CAT 25, para. 130. 
128
 See, Freeserve v Director General of Telecommunications [2003] CAT 5, paras 110-111 ‘[…] in our view 
this Tribunal is essentially an appellate tribunal, not a tribunal of first instance. In complainants’ appeals (as 
distinct, for example, from appeals against penalties) it seems to us that the primary task of the Tribunal will 
usually be to decide whether, on the material put before him by the complainant, the Director was correct in 
arriving at the conclusion that he did. If it turns out, in the course of the appeal, that the Director was 
insufficiently informed, in our view the appropriate course will usually be for the Tribunal to remit, rather than 
to attempt to investigate the merits for the first time’. 
129
  Albion Water Limited v Water Services Regulation Authority [2008] CAT 31, paras 70 & 72. 
130
 Dinah Rose QC & Tom Richards, Appeal and Review in the Competition Appeal Tribunal and High 
Court, Blackstone Chambers, op. cit. p. 19. 
131
 Ibid. 
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There will also be a spectrum of appropriate respect depending on the nature 
of the decision of the lower court which is challenged. At one end of the 
spectrum will be decisions of primary fact reached after an evaluation of oral 
evidence [,] where credibility is in issue [compared to] purely discretionary 
decisions. Further along the spectrum will be multi-factorial decisions often 
dependent on inferences and an analysis of documentary material.132 
Hence, re-hearing in an appeal does not amount to a rehearing ‘in the fullest sense 
of the word’, as the Court should ‘not normally interfere with the exercise of a 
discretion unless the decision of the lower [authority] was reached on wrong 
principles or was otherwise plainly wrong’.133 Hence, ‘in so far as rehearing [...] may 
have something of a range of meaning at the lesser end of the range it merges with 
that of [judicial] ‘review’, as, ‘at this margin, attributing one label or the other is a 
semantic exercise which does not answer such questions of substance as arise in 
any appeal’134. As the CAT has clearly explained in M.E. Burgess, ‘(i)n deciding 
whether to take its own decision, the Tribunal is mindful of the fact that it is an 
appellate tribunal [reviewing] an administrative decision and should not therefore turn 
itself into the primary decision-maker without good reason’ 135. There is a perceptible 
tension between this principle and the fact that ‘the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is a merits 
jurisdiction, and thus wider than a judicial review jurisdiction’136. 
It follows that some margin of appreciation may also persist in the context of an 
appellate review process, depending on the exact position of the specific category of 
the decision in the ‘spectrum of appropriate respect,’ from which decision-makers 
benefit in the first instance. ‘Multi-factorial’ decisions or decisions ‘dependent on 
inferences and an analysis of documentary material’ (thus involving a wide margin of 
interpretative choices and important sources of information or methodological and 
epistemic competence), require in general more respect for the choices made by the 
competition authority than its decisions over primary facts.  
The CAT has examined the penalties imposed by the CMA on a number of 
occasions137. The CAT may impose, revoke, or vary the amount of the fines 
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 Dupont de Nemours v Dupont [2003] EWCA Civ 1368, para. 94 cited by Dinah Rose QC & Tom 
Richards, Appeal and Review in the Competition Appeal Tribunal and High Court, Blackstone 
Chambers, op.cit. p.20. 
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 Ibid., paras 96-97. 
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 Ibid., para. 98. 
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 M.E. Burgess, J.J. Burgess & S.J. Burgess v. OFT, [2005] CAT 25, para. 129. 
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 Floe Telecomm v Office of Communications [2005] CAT 14, para. 65, “It is our intention that the tribunal 
should be primarily concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the conclusions contained in the appealed 
decision and not with how the decision was reached or the reasoning expressed in it. That will apply unless 
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Wherever possible, we want the tribunal to decide a case on the facts before it, even where there has been a 
procedural error, and to avoid remitting the case to the [competition authority]’. 
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 See appendix 1, Lianos, I., Jenny, F., Wagner von Papp, F., Motchenkova E., David, E. et al 
(2014) An Optimal and Just Financial Penalties System for Infringements of Competition Law: a 
Comparative Analysis (CLES Research paper series 3/2014, UCL Faculty of Laws: London). 
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imposed. The Tribunal is not bound by the OFT/CMA Guidance on penalties138. 
However, it will not disregard either the Guidance or the CMA’s approach and 
reasoning in the specific case139. The Tribunal also takes into account the objectives 
pursued by the CMA’s policy on fines, as explained in the Guidance on penalties 
when examining their reasonableness or proportionality140, while affording the OFT 
(or the CMA) some margin of appreciation141. The latter concept is interpreted 
differently than in the context of the “typical” judicial review, where it would “imply the 
presence of some restriction on the intensity of that review”142. The Tribunal has 
indeed held that its assessment “should focus primarily on whether the overall 
penalty imposed is appropriate for the infringements in question.” “[P]rovided that the 
OFT has remained within its margin of appreciation in applying the Guidance, the 
Tribunal’s primary task [will be] to assess the justice of the overall penalty, rather 
than to consider in minute detail the individual Steps applied by the OFT, particularly 
as regards Step 1 and Step 3”143. Reference to the “margin of appreciation” does 
not, according to the CAT, “in any way impede or diminish the Tribunal’s undoubted 
jurisdiction to reach its own independent view as to what is a just penalty in the light 
of all the relevant factors”144. The CAT will sanction any significant departure from 
the Guidance, although it also recognized that there is limited precedential value in 
decisions relating to penalties, “where the maxim that each case stands on its own 
facts is particularly pertinent”145. The “policymaking discretion” recognized by the 
OFT and the CMA in the interpretation and implementation of the Guidance may be 
illustrated by the following excerpt from Kier Group v. OFT: 
 
“The Guidance reflects the OFT’s chosen methodology for exercising its 
power to penalise infringements. It is expressed in relatively wide and non-
specific language, which is open to interpretation, and which is clearly 
designed to leave the OFT sufficient flexibility to apply its provisions in many 
different situations. Provided the penalty ultimately arrived at is, in the 
Tribunal’s view, appropriate it will rarely serve much purpose to examine 
minutely the way in which the OFT interpreted and applied the Guidance at 
each specific step. As the Tribunal said in Argos (above), the Guidance allows 
scope for adjusting at later stages a penalty which viewed in isolation at an 
earlier, provisional, stage might appear too high or too low. 
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On the other hand if […] the ultimate penalty appears to be excessive it will be 
important for the Tribunal to investigate and identify at which stage of the 
OFT’s process error has crept in. Assuming the Guidance itself is 
unimpugned […] the imposition of an excessive or unjust penalty is likely to 
reflect some misapplication or misinterpretation of the Guidance”146. 
 
In most instances, the CAT will first consider the implementation of the Guidance by 
the OFT/CMA, before proceeding to its own assessment of the level of the penalty 
on the basis of a “broad brush” approach taking the case as a whole, and refusing to 
adopt a “mechanistic approach”147. According to the Tribunal, the “determination of 
the penalty requires a refined consideration and assessment of all the relevant 
circumstances, and the element of deterrence, while undoubtedly one of those 
circumstances, should not lead to the level of penalty being calculated according to a 
mathematical formula”148.  
 
Notwithstanding the consideration of the OFT Guidelines, the CAT seems to 
exercise a quite intensive review of the financial penalties imposed by the OFT/CMA 
(or sector-specific regulators concurrently implementing EU and UK competition 
law), Out of the 12 appeals against infringement decisions of the OFT since April 
2001 and until the end of December 2013, the CAT has reversed the decision of the 
OFT setting fines once, while it increased the fine in one occasion and decreased 
the fine in 10 appeals against the decisions imposing financial penalties. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Appeals at the Competition Appeal Tribunal against financial 
penalties 
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Although the UK competition law enforcement system and, in particular, the judicial 
scrutiny phase has entered into an era of reform, the recent proposals by the 
Government on Streamlining Regulatory and Competition Appeals do not suggest 
any modification of the type and intensity of judicial scrutiny of penalties for 
infringement of competition law, although they suggest a move to a less intrusive 
judicial control for other types of decisions149. 
 
b. Germany150 
 
In the fines procedure, the competition authority issues a fines decision 
(‘Bußgeldbescheid’), which states, in particular, the nature of the offence, time and 
place of the alleged infringement, the legal elements of the offence, the available 
evidence, the fine and other sanctions, and an explanation of the possibility for a 
court decision by raising an ‘objection’ (‘Einspruch’).151 
In our context, it is important to note from the outset that an objection to the fines 
decision (‘Einspruch’) does not merely lead to a judicial ‘review’ of the administrative 
fines decision. Instead, once the person concerned objects to the decision, the 
decision loses its independent, constitutive character, and from then on it has the 
status of a mere indictment without any prejudicial value. The Court conducts a full 
de novo trial. As the Court follows the quasi-criminal procedure, extensive evidence 
will be taken.152 
Nor is the court confined by the authority's decision with respect to the amount of the 
fine.153 Objecting to a fines decision may therefore eventually result in a higher fine 
than the one that had been imposed by the competition authority (so-called 
reformatio in peius, a possibility to which the person concerned has to be alerted in 
the fines decision, § 66(2) no. 1(b) OWiG). While this may not have been a serious 
consideration in earlier times when the fines level was low,154 the Oberlandesgericht 
Düsseldorf has recently demonstrated that reformatio in peius can lead to a 
substantial increase; it increased the fines which the Bundeskartellamt had imposed 
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on the members of the Liquid Gas Cartel from approximately €180 million to €244 
million.155 
The objection against a fine decision by a competition authority is addressed to – 
and will in the first instance be reviewed by – this competition authority. The 
competition authority may reject the objection if it is inadmissible for procedural 
reasons (§ 69(1) OWiG). If it is admissible, the authority may take additional 
evidence and/or reconsider its decision (§ 69(2) OWiG). If the authority stands by its 
fines decision, it decides on whether to grant access to the file (§ 49 OWiG, § 147 
StPO). The authority then transfers the files to the public prosecutor's office, which at 
that instance becomes competent to initiate a public prosecution (§ 69(3), (4) OWiG). 
The public prosecutor has three options: it may take additional evidence, close the 
proceedings, or transfer the files to the court. In competition cases jurisdiction lies 
with the Higher Regional Court (OLG) in the district in which the competition 
authority has its seat (§ 83 GWB); where it was the Bundeskartellamt that imposed 
the fine, the OLG Düsseldorf has jurisdiction. Where the court considers the 
investigations ‘obviously insufficient’, it may send the files back. Otherwise, it decides 
on the procedural admissibility of the objection. Where the objection is admissible, 
the court may order the taking of further evidence. Under the statutory provisions (§ 
72 OWiG), the court – with the approval of the prosecutor and the person(s) 
concerned – could theoretically decide on the merits of the case without a trial, 
based solely on written submissions. However, in complex competition cases, this 
will not usually be an option, and a trial will ensue. 
The prosecution during the trial lies in the hands of the public prosecutor. The 
competition authority has only a supportive role.156 The court has to inform the 
competition authority of the trial date and provides the competition authority with the 
opportunity to state aspects of the case that are in its view relevant (§ 76(1) OWiG), 
and the court ‘may’ give the authority's representative the opportunity to ask 
questions from the persons concerned, including calling witnesses and expert 
witnesses (§ 82a(1) GWB). For actions for which the court requires the prosecution's 
approval, the court needs to consult the competition authority; however, where the 
public prosecutor approves while the competition authority objects, it is the public 
prosecutor that prevails. 
While the procedural rules for trials in administrative fines matters largely follow the 
rules for criminal trials, there are a number of accommodations of the strict standards 
applied in criminal trials. It should be noted that this is mostly because administrative 
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offences usually deal with minor matters and concern low fines, such as minor traffic 
infractions. Compared to the nature and gravity of other administrative offences, it is 
an abnormality that competition law infringements, with its huge fines, are classified 
as administrative and not criminal offences. Nevertheless, the courts do apply the 
relaxed rules of procedure even to complex cases where fines in the amount of 
several million of euros are concerned. One of the most important relaxations of the 
stringency of criminal trials is § 77 OWiG, which allows the court substantial flexibility 
with regard to the extent to which it allows evidence to be introduced in trials on 
administrative offences. In particular, the court may reject applications for taking 
evidence where it is persuaded that the evidence before the court has already 
revealed the truth. While such shortcuts are arguably an efficient way of disposing of 
minor run-of-the-mill administrative offence cases (such as traffic offences), the 
courts' discretion when deciding on multi-million euro fines on undertakings, or 
hundreds of thousands of euro fines on individuals, is problematic.157 The courts 
relatively frequent use of § 77 OWiG in competition cases is particularly problematic 
in view of the statutory admonition that the courts should take account of the 
‘importance of the matter before it’ when exercising its discretion concerning the 
extent of the introduction of evidence (§ 77(1)2 OWiG). 
Despite these relaxations, the quasi-criminal procedure guarantees a full and 
cumbersome taking of evidence. Konrad Ost, the Bundeskartellamt’s Director for 
General Policy, has recently noted that a medium-sized cartel, such as the Paper 
Wholesalers cartel, took 20 days in court; the Cement Cartel 37 days in court;, and 
the Liquid Gas Cartel 100 days in court over a total duration of three years.158 
 
c. France 
 
Decisions of the FCA can be challenged before the Paris Court of appeal (hereafter, 
the “Court”)159. According to Article L. 464-8 of the French Commercial Code, the 
Court exercises full control on the law and the facts. When the Court annuls a 
decision of the FCA, the Court may issue a full judgment imposing a fine, rather than 
the case coming back before the FCA in order for it to adopt a new decision160. 
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Decisions of the Court have no erga omnes effect. Therefore, the sanctioned 
undertakings which did not challenge the decision of the FCA do not benefit from any 
eventual annulation of this decision in favor of other undertakings161. 
 
The Court can reduce, confirm or increase162 the fines imposed by the FCA. The 
Court can also impose fines to a non-fined undertaking should the procedure before 
the Court provide sufficient evidence for doing so163. Nevertheless, the scope of the 
decision of the FCA may put a limit on the scope of the judicial scrutiny exercised by 
the Court. Therefore, for instance, when a decision rejecting a complaint is 
challenged, the Court cannot impose a fine on the undertaking, but the FCA still 
must take the case164. Except a few decisions165, it is well established that the Court 
cannot decide ultra petita. Therefore, the Court cannot increase a fine without a prior 
and reasoned request (generally from the Minister of the Economy)166. 
 
In contrast with the EU jurisprudence167, the Court controls if a fine was justified in 
principle168. The Court makes its own assessment of the proportionality of the fines 
imposed by the FCA. The most frequent reason to reduce the fines has been the 
financial and economic difficulties faced by the fined entity. In a very famous case 
(the Steel cartel case), the Paris Court of appeal has substantially reduced the fines 
imposed by the FCA (the total amount of the fines was €575 million; the amount of 
the reduction has been up to 90% for some undertakings)169. This judgment has 
been influential in the decision of the FCA to adopt its sentencing guidelines 
(hereafter, “SG”) in May 2011.  
 
To the time of writing, the Court has ruled four times on decisions where the SG was 
applied by the FCA and each time has confirmed the decisions of the FCA. 
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According to the Court170, the SG complies with the legal framework (Article L. 442-6 
of the French Commercial Code). The Court has ruled that, thanks to the SG, the 
FCA has described and explained its method of setting the amount of the fines 
imposed on entities. The Court has ruled that the SG has no normative value, since 
it must be considered as a guidance statement (administrative directive)171. The 
Court controls if the FCA has correctly applied the criteria set out in Article L. 442-6 
of the French Commercial Code (seriousness of the practices, damages caused to 
the Economy, personal situation of each fined entity and reiteration). 
Since the decisions rendered by the FCA are more reasoned, the ability for the Court 
to have its own assessment of the facts is limited. Therefore, the Court controls if the 
FCA has failed or erred in its assessment of the elements contained in the file. The 
Court has ruled that an appellant cannot refer to prior decisions or jurisprudence in 
order to argue a violation of the principle of equality of treatment, since this 
assessment must be done on a case by case basis172. What may appear more 
contestable is that the Court has also ruled that an undertaking cannot invoke as well 
the treatment of another party to the same procedure under the same reasoning173. 
We can suppose that the Court should increase its control on the assessment of the 
facts by the FCA. Nevertheless, because of the SG, the decisions rendered by the 
FCA are more reasoned (this is a confirmed tendency since the middle of the 
2000’s). Therefore, the Court is more reluctant to revise the reasoning of the FCA 
and the amount of the fines.  
 
3. United States 
 
We will focus here on the judicial scrutiny exercised by an appellate court to a 
sentencing judge, in view of the prosecutorial nature of the US enforcement system. 
The degree of deference an appellate court owes to a sentencing judge is still 
unclear in US law. Normally, as the Supreme Court explained in Booker the 
“statutory language, the structure of the Sentencing Reform Act, and the sound 
administration of justice, taken together, require appellate courts to apply 
“reasonableness standard(s) of review”174. In Kimbrough175, Spears176 and 
Pepper177, the Supreme Court held however that a sentencing judge’s sentencing 
determination may be subject to a more intensive judicial scrutiny, close to that of the 
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Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (the “arbitrary and capricious review”) if the 
sentencing judge imposes a sentence that varies from the Guidelines on the basis of 
a policy disagreement178. In view of the institutional characteristics of the Sentencing 
Commission, which has capabilities to collect and analyze empirical data and 
national experience, the Supreme Court felt that although the Sentencing Guidelines 
are advisory, in “light of the “discrete institutional strengths” of the Sentencing 
Commission and sentencing judges”, they should be offered some degree of 
respect179. According to Justice Breyer (concurring opinion) in Pepper: 
“(t)he trial court typically better understands the individual circumstances of 
particular cases before it, while the Commission has comparatively greater 
ability to gather information, to consider a broader national picture, to 
compare sentences attaching to different offenses, and ultimately to write 
more coherent overall standards that reflect nationally uniform, not simply 
local, sentencing policies”180. 
Hence, a “sliding scale” framework of review requires appellate courts to subject 
sentencing judges’ decisions to a more intensive review, when they rest upon a 
disagreement with the policy followed by the Guidelines; Judges are also offered 
“greater deference” when their determination is based on “case-specific factors”181. 
Indeed, appellate courts should review those decisions with greater deference when 
they rest upon case-specific circumstances that place the case outside a specific 
Guideline’s ‘heartland”182. 
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